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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a powerful driver of economic growth and 
development, particularly in the developing world. FDI can lead to greater 
efficiencies in the local economy through a number of different channels such as the 
transfer of technology, increase in competition, and job creation. This dissertation 
discusses the costs and benefits derived from FDI as well as examining various 
complementary issues to FDI, such as the relevance of fiscal incentives and the 
varying effects of different modes of entry. 
 This study further analyses the determinants of FDI into South Africa for the period 
1961-2009, through the use of two different econometric techniques – time series 
and panel data analysis. The results from the time series analysis concur largely with 
previous studies, finding market size, exchange rate, macroeconomic (in)stability 
and infrastructure to all be statistically significant determinants of FDI inflows into 
South Africa.  
South Africa underwent a major political and economic change in 1994 with the end 
of Apartheid. This fundamental shift in the economy has also affected the 
determinants of FDI into the country. To this end a panel data analysis was 
conducted between 1994 and 2009, the results of which are more suitable for 
forecasting. This analysis found similar results to the time series analysis, although 
the relative importance of the determinants varies somewhat, and two additional 
variables – education and labour productivity – were also found to be statistically 
significant determinants in the panel data analysis.  
The dissertation concludes by discussing the policy implications that derive from the 
findings of the econometric analysis and offers some policy advice in terms of 
attracting greater FDI into South Africa, based on the findings of this analysis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is seen as an increasingly important driver of 
economic growth and development, particularly within the developing world. A 
number of authors have (e.g. Basu et al., 2003; Li and Liu, 2005) found a positive 
statistical relationship between FDI and economic growth. As a result, successfully 
attracting Multinational Corporations (MNCs) has become a major policy among 
developing country governments. Certain FDI determinants such as market size, 
education levels, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and openness appear to be 
relatively universal. However, these factors vary in relative importance from country 
to country depending on their levels in each, as well as the structure of the economy 
and the type of FDI that is generally attracted to each economy. This means it is 
important to conduct individual analyses of the determinants of FDI for each specific 
country – one size does not fit all. 
South Africa is a medium sized, developing country. Its GDP in 2009 was reported 
as R2423 billion (Statistics SA. 2010). Real growth in GDP over the past 10 years 
has been strong, consistently above 2.5% per annum, and reaching 5.5% in 2007 
(Statistics SA. 2010). Despite this consistent growth, poverty remains prevalent. 
According to the Human Development Report (2009), South Africa is only listed at 
85th out of 182 countries in the Human Poverty index (HPI) and at a mere 129th in the 
Human Development Index (HDI). 
One of the main reasons for South Africa’s high poverty levels and lack of 
development stems from its political history. Prior to 1994, non-whites were excluded 
from the mainstream economy which resulted in a situation of high inequality, lack of 
skills and widespread levels of extreme poverty. In the last 15 years the country’s 
new government (the African National Congress) has aimed at reducing these 
discrepancies; however as evidenced by the HDI and HPI figures, these initiatives 
have met with mixed success. The sustained levels of higher growth up until 2009 
have certainly had a positive impact on South Africa. The higher growth rates are 
driven by consumption which encourages greater investment by firms; this includes 
hiring more workers and paying better wages. These workers then have more money 
to spend and so continue to drive consumption and hence economic growth whilst 
also reducing poverty.   
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Foreign Direct Investment has often been viewed as the important component of 
economic growth within developing countries (including South Africa), particularly 
within popular opinion, led in part by the media. Many developing country citizens 
feel that the developed world is much better at doing business more efficiently. 
Foreign Direct Investment therefore provides an opportunity for local firms to improve 
their productivity by learning from and competing directly with foreign firms, thereby 
increasing economic growth rates. There is a great deal of evidence to support these 
claims; with numerous authors (Saggi, 2002; Rodrik, 1999) providing support for this 
hypothesis and showing how this process can occur through externalities. 
There have been a number of previous South Africa-specific studies on the 
determinants of FDI. Fedderke and Romm (2004) and Moolman et al. (2006) both 
conducted time series regression analysis, whilst Hausman et al. (2005) conducted a 
survey analysis of the top executives in South African-based MNCs as well as local 
South African firms. 
These studies determined market size, trade openness, macroeconomic stability, 
exchange rate and infrastructure to be the most important determinants of FDI 
inflows into South Africa. These results largely concur with the findings of similar 
international studies, although education – deemed a most important determinant for 
many international studies – is excluded from the South African studies, primarily 
due to the lack of reliable data over the period studied. It is important to conduct 
country-specific analyses as, even if the findings largely concur with the international 
literature, the relative importance of these determinants will vary from country to 
country, which can significantly influence potential policy within the country. 
The first objective of this dissertation, therefore, is to conduct a further time series 
analysis of the determinants of FDI inflows into South Africa. The time series model 
tests the relative importance of determinants of FDI into South Africa for the period 
1961-2009.  
The second aim of this study is to conduct a further, panel data analysis on a 
shorter, more recent time period in order to gain further insight into the main drivers 
of FDI flows into South Africa. South Africa ended Apartheid, a long period of political 
oppression, in 1994. The structure of the economy and, in particular, the 
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fundamental drivers of FDI inflows have changed since this time. During Apartheid, 
many countries imposed both moral as well as economic sanctions on the country 
which had a significant effect on FDI flows. The nature of Apartheid also meant that 
the majority of the population was barred from much of the mainstream economy 
which had a huge detrimental effect on economic growth and development. Lastly 
the constant political turmoil during Apartheid was in itself a major deterrent to 
potential investors, whilst it also led to increased macroeconomic instability which 
also deterred potential investors. We can therefore conclude that the determinants of 
FDI into South Africa have fundamentally changed since the end of Apartheid. This 
conclusion is supported also by empirical analysis – Fedderke and Romm (2004) 
include a sanctions dummy in their regression analysis to capture the effects of 
Apartheid on FDI inflows. This dummy variable was statistically significant and 
positive, indicating significantly higher levels of FDI inflows post-Apartheid. 
This means that the relative importance of the different determinants of FDI inflows 
may have changed since the end of Apartheid, which in turn means that pre-1994 
FDI analysis may be invalid for future forecasting and therefore not applicable for 
policymakers. Hence this panel data analysis will just focus on the post Apartheid 
period, thus eliminating this problem and producing more useful results for 
policymakers. 
The panel data approach also allows the analysis of sector-specific FDI inflows, so 
that it is possible to see the individual impact of specific sectors on FDI inflows into 
South Africa. Lastly, much of the data is incomplete and unreliable for the period 
prior to 1994; hence the panel data model is able to include three additional and 
important variables: Education, Labour productivity and Labour costs. 
 Chapter two provides a comprehensive analysis of the previous FDI scholarship. 
This chapter discusses the findings of previous studies on the determinants of FDI in 
South Africa as well as in other countries and in cross-country analyses. The chapter 
also discusses the potential benefits and costs of FDI and deals with other FDI-
specific issues including the merits of fiscal incentives and the different effects of 
different types of FDI. 
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Chapter three is an explanation of the econometric methodology used in the models 
included in this paper. This chapter discusses issues of stationarity and cointegration 
pertaining to time series analysis and explains both the Engle-Granger methodology 
as well as the Vector Autoregressive model. This chapter also discusses the panel 
data model and provides a justification for the use of the Fixed Effects Model in this 
case. 
Chapter four presents the results from the different models tested in this analysis. 
These results largely concur with the findings of previous studies, but it is the relative 
importance of the various determinants that is the main difference between countries 
and this analysis provides a better understanding of this in the South African context. 
Lastly chapter five concludes the paper and offers a brief discussion of the policy 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) is defined as private capital flows into a country 
different to that in which the parent firm is situated. These investments include equity 
capital, intercompany debt and reinvested earnings. It is important to distinguish 
between FDI and portfolio investment. Capital investment is commonly described in 
the literature as being FDI as opposed to portfolio investment if it is large enough to 
give the parent firm some level of control over the management of the enterprise 
(Jensen, 2003: 588). This equity is usually greater than 10% of the firm. Unlike 
portfolio investment, FDI has long term horizons and is therefore generally not 
speculative or footloose investment. This stability is what makes FDI so valuable to 
recipient countries.  
It is possible to distinguish between two types of FDI inflows: horizontal FDI and 
vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI refers to a case in which MNCs (Multinational 
Corporations) have their headquarters in their home country and have production 
plants both at home and abroad that produce the same goods. Vertical FDI, on the 
other hand, refers to a situation in which MNCs fragment different stages of 
production by having their headquarters in their home country and production plants 
in different foreign countries that produce different intermediate or final goods 
(Fedderke and Romm. 2004: 13). 
FDI can also be divided into three categories by its purpose: natural resource- 
seeking FDI, market-seeking FDI and efficiency-seeking FDI. Historically, a large 
proportion of Foreign Investment was focused in natural resources, indeed the 
development of South Africa’s mining industry following the discovery of diamonds 
and the gold in the late 19th century, owes much to the inflow of foreign capital into 
this sector (Gelb, 2002: 2). Although most FDI flows nowadays are based in either 
manufacturing or services, extractive industries still attract a large amount of FDI, 
particularly in Africa which is blessed with natural resource endowments and lacks a 
well-developed manufacturing or services sector. 
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Akinlo (2004) examines the effect of FDI inflows into extractive industries in Nigeria. 
Nigeria has attracted a large amount of FDI, predominantly in extractive industries, 
primarily oil. He argues that FDI in extractive industries has much lower indirect 
beneficial effects on the economy. The industry is usually separated from the rest of 
the economy with few linkages. Secondly, the transfer of technology from foreign 
firms to domestic ones may be less in extractive industries as the technology is 
usually embodied on highly capital-intensive production. Thirdly, due to the large 
economies of scale in the extractive sector, the presence of MNCs may not 
encourage new entrants as it would in manufacturing. Lastly, forward- and 
backward-linkages in the extractive sector are far less important as the production 
process requires significantly fewer inputs and intermediate goods from domestic 
suppliers, whilst the output is destined for foreign markets (Akinlo, 2004: 628). 
Akinlo (2004) also conducts a time-series econometric analysis on the effect of 
extractive FDI on Nigeria’s growth rate. He finds that there is only a positive effect 
after a considerable lag and is insignificant. He concludes that this shows that 
extractive FDI results in significantly lower economic growth for the country as 
compared to FDI into other sectors. 
The majority of FDI goes into either manufacturing or the services sector. This FDI 
can be divided in market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. Market-seeking FDI is 
attracted to the host countries market and aims to sell its products into that market. 
Market size and economic growth are key determinants of market-seeking FDI. The 
rationale of such investment is based on the desire to be close to the consumers, 
this could be due to high transport costs, discriminatory government procurement 
policies or to avoid import barriers (Agarwal, 1997: 12). 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is focused primarily on the export market as opposed to the 
host market and so the determinants of this type of investment will be the lowest cost 
and lowest risk environment, including factors such as infrastructure, wage costs and 
taxes (Agarwal, 1997: 13). Efficiency-seeking FDI tends to be footloose with 
relatively narrow margins, thus making it less reliable and less-conducive to a 
country’s long-term development as it is liable to leave as soon as another country 
offers a cheaper production environment (Kransdorff, 2010: 71). 
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2.2 Trends in FDI 
Global attitudes towards FDI have changed over time. In the 1950s countries around 
the world, particularly more developed nations, embraced FDI and it was assumed 
that FDI was vital for long-term economic growth and development. However, the 
1960s brought with it a reversal in attitudes towards foreign investment. It became 
universally accepted that the associated financial and political costs were 
unacceptably high, whilst research suggested that FDI was exploitative (Carim, 
1994: 3). 
The 1970s view towards FDI remained upon similar lines to that of the previous 
decades. However, by the end of the 70s and continuing into the 1980s, during 
which there were multiple economic crises, it became generally accepted that the 
anti-FDI view was largely misplaced. Countries once again focused upon attracting 
FDI, although most were more cautious than previously, attempting to learn from the 




Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank Data 
Since the mid-1980s FDI flows have grown very quickly. As figure 1 demonstrates, 
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this growth has not been uniformly upwards, as evidenced by the two major dips 
2000 and 2007/8, the trend has been upwards.
ascribed to global economic crises. The first was the crisis following the bursting of 
the dot com bubble. Whilst the most recent is still ongoing and stems from the sub
prime lending crisis which began with US banks but h
economy (World Bank, 2010)
Figure 2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of FDI by region. The figure clearly shows the lack of 
FDI flows into Africa, with the region 
Developed countries receive the majority of FDI flows 
with developing countries receiving the remainder (Global Finance, 2010).
Since the 1980s, investment flows have shifted tow
manufacturing and, in particular, services. Over 60% of global FDI flows are now 
within the services sector rather than manufacturing or natural resources 
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as affected the entire global 
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receiving a paltry 4% of total global FDI flows. 
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2.3 Dunning’s Eclectic Theory 
John Dunning’s framework is generally considered as the paradigmatic theory of 
explaining a multinational firm’s investment decision. He details three main reasons 
for a firm to invest abroad: ownership, location and internalization (Jensen. 2003: 
590). 
Firms have ownership specific advantages when they have some technological 
advantage over existing firms in the foreign market, such as a better product, asset 
or more efficient process. MNCs will invest abroad in order to exploit these 
advantages and secure higher returns e.g. a firm has ownership advantages over its 
rivals in terms of a patent or knowledge of marketing; its brand name; or its 
marketing techniques (Dunning, 1981: 31; Jensen. 2003: 591; Gastanaga et al., 
1998: 1300). 
Firms may invest in a foreign country because of locational advantages i.e. why it is 
preferable for the MNC to locate in the host country (as opposed to in another 
country). Locational advantage is based on the firms’ decision whether to internalise 
the use of their assets i.e. set up a direct subsidiary within the host country, or rather 
to sell the right to manufacture those products or use a specific technology to firms 
based in other countries (Dunning, 1981: 31). This advantage may come from a host 
country’s comparative advantage or from that lack of tariffs incurred by producing 
locally or due to lower transportation costs to these markets (Gastanga et al., 1998: 
1301). Or it could be related to endowments – either natural resources or high quality 
and low cost of labour force (Jensen. 2003: 591). 
The third factor, according to Dunning, in firms determining whether to invest locally 
is named internalisation advantages. This concept captures the firm-specific 
motivations for a firm choosing to produce the product abroad within the organization 
itself, rather than not simply license a foreign producer to make the item for the 
parent company (Jensen. 2003: 591). This depends on the attraction of location-
specific endowments i.e. those endowments that are offered by the host country and 
not the home country and that are non-transferable across geographic boundaries 
(Dunning, 1981: 31). 
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Dunning’s framework explains why a MNC would invest in a foreign market but it 
does not explain which countries will attract that FDI. FDI remains a firm-level 
decision but countries have varied in their ability to attract it. The first factor depends 
primarily on the individual firm and its production techniques and decisions, however 
the second and third advantages are influenced by host country endowments, 
policies and institutions (Gastanaga et al., 1998: 1301). 
Dunning (1981: 38) also finds evidence that the levels of both inward and outward 
FDI are linked to a country’s stages of development. He posits a four stage 
investment-development process. In the first stage there is very little FDI of any sort. 
This stage is followed by a period of rising inward FDI, but outward FDI remains low. 
The third stage is a period of rising outward investment but Net Investment is still 
negative, i.e. inward FDI still exceeds outward FDI. In the Final stage Net Investment 
is positive, this stage relates to well-developed countries (Dunning, 1981: 38). 
 
2.4 Domestic vs. Foreign Investment 
An important question in the study of FDI relates to domestic investment. Firstly, why 
is foreign investment more desirable than domestic investment, if in fact it is; and 
secondly, does FDI crowd domestic investment in or out? 
Both Foreign and domestic investment are important for a country – both increase 
capital accumulation and both are constantly seeking to be more productively 
efficient. Additional investment of either kind also implies greater competition in the 
relevant industry which should augment the process and reduce society’s 
deadweight loss. However, foreign investment is associated with a number of 
indirect effects, particularly technology transfer and diffusion which can raise 
productivity for all local firms and therefore has a significant additional benefit 
(Carim, 1994: 7). 
The fundamental reason why FDI should be more productive than domestic 
investment is due to the fact that domestic firms have local knowledge and expertise 
which gives them an advantage in the domestic market. In order for foreign firms to 
be able to compete with this disadvantage, they must be more productively efficient 
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than local firms; if they weren’t then they would not enter in the first place. This 
greater productive efficiency is likely gained from more advanced technology or 
production techniques and hence advanced technology transfer to the local market 
can occur (Borensztein et al., 1998: 133). 
De Soysa and Oneal (1999) tested for the relative effects of domestic and foreign 
investment using a sample of 97 countries for the years 1980-1991.They find that 
both domestic and foreign investment have a positive effect on the growth rate. 
Domestic capital stocks were nearly thirteen times as large as foreign capital stocks 
but new foreign capital was 2.5 times as productive as domestic investment. It was 
also established that the two sources of capital are complementary. Investment by 
one source may encourage the other source of the benefits of an investment. Both 
will also invest in infrastructure for their business which will have spillover effects for 
others. Other externality effects such as technology transfer may also occur, thus 
benefiting all other firms and investment. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) ran a similar regression, including a sample of 69 
developing countries and found similar results with regards to both the relative 
productivity of the two sources of investment, as well as the complementarity 
between the two.  
Different types of economic distortions may, however, diminish the role of FDI as an 
engine for advanced technology transfer. By offering fiscal incentives, such as tax 
breaks, the disadvantage that foreign investment naturally faces due to lack of local 
knowledge, is eradicated and thus FDI entering the local market may be no more 
efficient than domestic investment and, depending on the extent of incentives, may 
even be less efficient than domestic investment. This will then eradicate FDI as a 
means for technology transfer and will be more likely to crowd out domestic 
investment (Borensztein et al., 1998: 134). 
Similarly a highly protectionist trade regime may cause similar distortions as foreign 
firms are forced to invest locally due to the huge tariffs, hence ruling out exports for 
the firm. In this case the foreign investment is once again, not necessarily more 
efficient than local firms but is forced to invest due to economic distortions 
(Borensztein et al., 1998: 134). 
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Both Foreign investment and domestic investment are important contributors to a 
country’s development, however the unique conditions which allow and encourage 
foreign investment, namely greater productivity, means that FDI can act as an 
engine for the transfer of advanced technology to the host country which then has 
spillover effects for local firms. Empirical evidence confirms the higher productivity of 
foreign investment, as well as indicating that there is complementarity between the 
two sources of investment. However, introducing market distortions, such as fiscal 
incentives or a protectionist trade regime, may completely change the incentive 
structure for foreign investment, thus eradicating the benefits to the host country of 
foreign investment. 
 
2.5 Mode of Entry 
The choice between exporting and FDI is a key decision for MNCs. Exporting is 
generally associated with high(er) transport costs as well as (and usually more 
significantly) barriers to entry into the local market which include not only tariff 
barriers but also non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which can take many forms including 
meeting minimum environmental, labour and health standards. On the other hand, 
FDI usually requires significant sunk costs with the initial investment, though 
marginal costs will generally be lower due to the lack of export costs.  
Saggi (2002: 202) proposes a two period model to explain a firm’s choice between 
FDI and exports. The firm initially exports to the market which yields information 
regarding the local demand for the firm’s product. If the demand is large enough to 
justify the large sunk costs of FDI, then the MNC will invest directly in the second 
period. 
If a firm has decided to invest directly in a foreign market, it must then make the 
crucial decision regarding its mode of entry. A MNC can establish a wholly owned 
subsidiary in the host country, which is known as a Greenfield investment; or can 
work with a local partner through a Joint venture (JV), or can simply buy a local firm 
in the form of an acquisition. There are costs and benefits for each form of entry for 
both the firm as well as the host country. 
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An MNC will choose to invest via a JV in order to gain knowledge of the domestic 
market which it would otherwise have to learn itself, a potentially costly process. 
However when an MNC has only partial control over an investment it is far less likely 
to impart technology transfer. In the case of a Greenfields entry, technology transfer 
between the parent firm and the affiliate is far more likely (Bhaumik and Gelb, 2005: 
7).  
Technology diffusion between the MNC affiliate and the rest of the local economy will 
happen at a faster rate in the case of a JV, as the local partner is constantly 
attempting to acquire the technological advantage of the foreign firm. In practice, JVs 
rarely last more than a couple of years due to the constant conflict between the 
partners, and after a couple of years the foreign partner will have acquired the 
requisite local knowledge (Bhaumik and Gelb, 2005: 7). 
Acquisitions are wholly owned by the MNC and so technology transfer to the affiliate 
will be greater than in the JV and the MNC can gain local knowledge as well as local 
market share through an acquisition. However, there are significant restructuring 
costs associated with acquisitions as well as the cost of acquisition itself, may make 
such a transaction expensive for a MNC (Bhaumik and Gelb, 2005: 8) 
Hence, a Greenfields entry; which entails a foreign investor investing directly in a 
new enterprise in the home market without any form of acquisition or joint venture; is 
the most cost-effective, and therefore most likely, if the MNC has previous 
experience operating in the market. Greenfield investment is also more likely if there 
is only a small cultural distance between the home country and the host. Conversely, 
if the local market is underdeveloped and government a hindrance to business then 
entrance costs are greater and hence a JV is more likely (Bhaumik and Gelb, 2005: 
9). 
The type of industry may also have an impact on the mode of entry. Smarzynska 
(1999) argues that industries in the technological sectors or that use more advanced 
technology in their production processes are more concerned about protecting their 
technology and hence are more likely to enter directly in the form of a Greenfields 
investment. On the other hand, Saggi (2002: 204) argues that firms in industries 
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which are characterized by a fast changing technological environment will only be 
hurt for a short period of time by technology diffusion. 
 
2.6 Potential Benefits 
There are numerous benefits to countries able to attract FDI. These benefits can be 
divided into direct benefits; such as employment creation, supplementing local 
savings and improved foreign exchange reserves; and indirect benefits; such as 
technology transfer and enhanced efficiency. Most of these benefits are ultimately 
channels through which FDI leads to higher economic growth and development. 
Numerous studies (e.g. Basu et al., 2003; Li and Liu, 2005) have examined this link 
between FDI and growth. Despite methodological difficulties, such as reverse 
causation, most of these studies have found a positive relationship between FDI and 
economic growth, thus lending weight to the theoretical argument. 
When MNCs enter the local market, they primarily employ local workers and thus 
there is a direct creation of jobs (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 243). Furthermore, 
a number of studies (De Soysa and Oneal, 1999; Borensztein et al., 1998) have 
found foreign and domestic investment to be complementary, suggesting that the 
arrival of MNCs in the local market does not lead to significant job losses amongst 
already established local firms. Aaron (1999: 3) estimates that the direct employment 
effect of FDI in developing countries in 1997 was about 26 million jobs. Indirect 
employment through increased linkages with local firms i.e. the creation of new local 
firms in order to supply inputs to the MNCs can have an even larger effect on 
employment (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 243). Aaron (1999: 3) estimates a 
multiplier of 1.6 (1.6 indirect jobs created for every direct job created by the entry of 
an MNC). 
Multinationals entering the market will also widen the tax base and will, depending 
on whether and the amount of fiscal incentives offered by the government, increase 
government revenues (Carim, 1994: 6). 
Another benefit from FDI is that it can supplement local savings. The savings rate in 
many Less Developed Countries (LDCs), particularly in Africa is very low. FDI can 
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help to fill the gap between savings and required investment, thus helping with 
capital formation and hence growth (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 244). 
FDI inflows may also assist a developing country build up foreign exchange 
reserves, thus allowing greater monetary stability and assisting with increased trade 
and global integration (Carim. 1994: 6) 
The indirect benefits from FDI are just as important, if not more so, than the direct 
effects from FDI. The indirect benefits from FDI to a host country focus primarily on 
the transfer of advanced technology and management techniques from developed 
countries to the host economy. This improved technology will improve productive 
efficiency in the host economy, which in turn increases economic growth. This 
technology transfer can occur through a number of different channels. 
There are four major channels through which FDI can lead to technology transfer to 
the domestic market: 
• Demonstration effects – local firms can imitate multi-national firms’ techniques. 
Reverse engineering and other similar procedures allow firms to ‘learn-by-
doing’ (Saggi, 2002: 209). 
• Labour training effects – workers trained by multi-national firms may transfer 
information and skills to local firms by switching employers or starting their own 
businesses via natural labour turnover. An excellent real-world example of the 
labour turnover effect was demonstrated in Bangladesh. Desh, a Bangladeshi 
garment manufacturer, though not strictly a MNC, benefited from very close ties 
to the Korean firm Daewoo. Eventually 115 out of 130 workers left Desh to set 
up their own firms or join newly established garment manufacturers (Saggi, 
2002: 211). 
• Competition effect – Multi-national firms are more efficient when first entering 
the market, this is necessary as they need to enter the market in the first place 
and they lack local knowledge and market share. So in order to survive they 
must have lower costs and higher productive efficiency. This will ensure that the 
market becomes more competitive and forces domestic firms to streamline and 
become more efficient themselves in order to compete. So their productivity will 
improve because of greater competition (Carim, 1994: 14). 
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• Vertical linkages – multinationals may transfer technology and skills to local 
firms that are potential suppliers of intermediate goods or buyers of their 
products (Saggi, 2002: 212). The Mexican automotive industry provides an 
example of the vertical linkages effect. Within 5 years of investments by major 
auto manufacturers there were over 300 domestic producers of automobile 
parts and accessories, of which 110 had annual sales of more than $1 million 
(Moran, 1998). 
 
The idea that foreign ownership of firms increases efficiency and as a result 
profitability and therefore, ultimately economic growth, is supported by empirical 
evidence. Perez-Gonzalez (2005) investigated firms’ productivity after a foreign 
investor had gained more than 50% of the firm’s equity i.e. total control. He found 
strong evidence suggesting that productivity, computed using data on future 
earnings, increases. These findings are further supported by a second paper by 
Chari et al. (2005). They show that there is a positive response in the stock market 
price of the firm following a foreign ownership takeover. 
 
Basu et al. (2003) studied a panel of 23 countries for the period 1978 to 1996. Their 
results indicate that there is a long-run steady state relationship between FDI and 
growth.   
 
Hansen and Rand (2006: 22) also find a positive relationship between FDI and GDP 
and estimated that a one percentage point increase in FDI leads to a 2.25% increase 
in GDP. They also find that 11 out of 14 previous econometric studies examining this 
relationship, similarly find a positive correlation between FDI and GDP. 
 
Li and Liu (2005) used a dataset covering 84 countries, and encompassing both 
developed and developing countries, over the period 1970-1999. They conclude that 
FDI has a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth in both 
developing and developed countries. They also find that this relationship has 
become more endogenous over time. FDI is attracted to a large market size and FDI 
leads to higher growth which in turn increases the market size further. Similarly, FDI 
is attracted to locations with high human capital and infrastructure, whilst FDI has a 
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positive effect on local skills and infrastructure resulting in a virtuous circle. 
Unfortunately it also means that those small, undeveloped countries struggling to 
attract FDI become even more unattractive to FDI over time. 
 
This endogeneity is problematic when trying to isolate the effect of FDI on economic 
growth. However most studies that do test for Granger causality (Choe, 2003; Li and 
Liu, 2005; Zhang, 2001) agree that FDI does have an effect on growth (Hansen and 
Rand, 2006: 37) 
 
2.7 Potential Costs 
Despite the significant potential benefits to a host country able to successfully attract 
FDI, there are also a number of potential costs when encouraging huge multinational 
enterprises into a developing country. 
One of the major criticisms of FDI centres on the relative size of most MNCs when 
compared to smaller developing countries. The turnover of many MNCs is many 
times larger than the GDP of many developing countries, resulting in the fear that 
MNCs may exert higher than optimal influence on these governments and their 
policies. This could result in a loss of sovereignty or in the MNCs ‘capturing’ the 
policymakers so that future policies are designed to benefit MNCs and not 
necessarily the economy or country as a whole (Carim, 1994: 10). 
Not many developing countries would see the activities of TNCs as a threat to 
their sovereignty. [Some] countries... have been able to take advantage of 
TNC investment to increase employment, exports and government revenues, 
to improve living standards, and even to enhance their own national economic 
power. In particular, TNC inward investment, correctly handled, has proven to 
be an effective way of enhancing domestic management capacity and 
technological skills... and there is certainly now a new and more pragmatic 
approach. This derives from the belief that developing countries can structure 
their relationships with transnational corporations in ways that will ensure that 
the overall benefits... are not outweighed by negative factors (UNCTC, 1992: 
4-5). 
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Multinationals have tended to be fairly good corporate citizens in practice. Most are 
law-abiding and work cooperatively with governments as generally the optimal 
policies and practices of the two entities coincide. For example, both MNCs and 
government would promote a favourable business environment as both will benefit 
(Carim, 1994: 10). 
Controlling MNCs can be a difficult prospect. There is no supranational body to 
regulate and control their operations and the competing legal frameworks of the 
various host countries undermine the collective power of the individual governments. 
There are two issues for governments to address, firstly the feasibility and ability to 
exert some element of control over MNCs, and secondly whether there is political will 
to control MNCs (Carim, 1994: 11). 
Another concern stems from the fact that MNCs generally raise most of their capital 
in the host country and may crowd out domestic firms from raising capital from 
domestic sources (Carim, 1994: 11). There is also a great deal of scepticism 
regarding the labour practices of certain multinationals, particularly those invested in 
footloose capital. These firms tend to leave at a moment’s notice, which may result in 
the long-term costs exceeding the short-term benefits from such investment (Carim, 
1994: 12). 
Critics argue the benefits of FDI come at a considerable cost to governments and 
their citizens. The push to attract FDI frequently pressures governments to provide a 
climate that is more hospitable to foreign corporations, in the process potentially 
changing domestic economic policy and increasing inefficiencies rather than 
reducing them.  In the extreme there is even the potential to challenge the 
sovereignty of the nation state and the capacity for democratic governance as large 
MNCs put undue pressure on weak developing governments (Jensen, 2003: 594). 
However these arguments are generally baseless. Governments should always be 
aware that Foreign investment is only superior to domestic investment if it introduces 
new technologies to the market i.e. is more efficient than local firms. Any failure to 
take cognisance of this fundamental of FDI is a failure by government and the local 
bureaucratic processes rather than a criticism of FDI itself. 
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2.8 Fiscal Incentives 
Due to the large potential benefits from FDI, governments attempt to attract FDI. On 
of the foremost methods of attracting FDI (though not necessarily the most effective) 
is by offering fiscal incentives such as tax holidays to potential investors. The trend 
has been an increasing number of governments offering such incentives as the 
potential benefits of FDI are further realised and as trade liberalisation and the 
resultant market integration has reduced the importance of other determinants of 
FDI, most notably market size (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 2). 
The economic rationale behind fiscal incentives is based on the spillover effects in 
the form of technology transfer from foreign firms, which can be modelled as a 
positive externality and will therefore be underprovided in a market. Hence 
subsidising this investment through fiscal incentives such as lower tax can be seen 
as simply correcting for market failure (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 3). 
In practice the reasons for offering tax incentives are more political in nature. Any 
government will find it difficult to back out of a bidding contest with another country 
for FDI as it will be viewed as a government failure and a loss of pride, given that 
politics and elections are all about public perception, this is a crucial factor and may 
result in a ‘race to the bottom’ with each country undercutting the others in an 
attempt to lure the FDI, even if the fiscal incentives far outweigh the potential 
benefits (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 17). This situation can be modelled as a 
multi-person prisoner’s dilemma, with the result that all countries end up worse off, 
whilst the MNC benefits (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 20). 
Some of the perceived benefits from FDI, particularly increased employment, are 
immediately observable, whilst the costs are delayed and almost impossible to 
quantify (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 17). Hence governments are encouraged to 
attempt to attract FDI and as a result may well overbid. 
Fiscal incentives will primarily target efficiency-seeking FDI. Market-seeking FDI is 
drawn primarily by market size and complementary factors, whilst natural resource-
seeking FDI is primarily attracted to natural endowments. Efficiency-seeking FDI 
however is drawn by the cheapest production location of which tax is a major 
determinant. Efficiency-seeking FDI focuses primarily on the export market and has 
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slim margins. As a result this form of FDI is footloose and will leave as soon as a 
more profitable location is available and is therefore not ideal for stimulating long-
term growth and development within the host country. Nevertheless, in the short- to 
medium-term, whilst the FDI remains in the host country, it will benefit the country’s 
economic growth, employment and development (Kransdorff, 2010: 71). 
There are a number of different fiscal incentives available to governments in 
attracting potential foreign investment. The first option is for governments to simply 
maintain a low general corporate tax rate. The simplicity of the system itself is a 
major benefit and attraction as it reduces compliance costs for the MNC and reduces 
bureaucratic and administrative costs for the host country, whilst also reducing tax 
avoidance. A low general tax rate, as opposed to specific, targeted taxes also 
indicates the government’s willingness to allow the market to work without 
interference to determine the most profitable investments. However, a low general 
tax rate will reduce the tax revenues, at least in the short to medium term before 
additional FDI enters the market to widen the tax base (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 
13). 
As a result, many governments rely on tax incentives which have a minimal initial 
effect on tax revenue and allow the government to target certain industries which 
would, theoretically, bring greater benefits to the country (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 
14). 
A popular and frequently used tax incentive is the tax holiday, which temporarily 
reduces the corporate tax rate. The primary benefit of the tax holiday is that a 
profitable firm will immediately benefit significantly, whereas the benefits from a 
lower general tax rate will accumulate slowly over time. As a result, tax holidays 
mainly benefit short-term investments in footloose industries and therefore fail to 
have as large an impact on the host country as would be desirable. Tax holidays 
also tend to reward investment in a new firm rather than reinvestment in a new firm 
and they penalise long-term investors (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 14). 
Many countries, particularly in the developed world, also allow fast write-offs for 
investment expenditures. The advantage is that this incentive correctly targets the 
desired activity as the firm will only earn lower capital investments if it engages in 
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capital expenditure. Such an incentive also encourages firms to take a long-term 
view of their investment (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 15). 
Lastly governments can reduce or even eliminate taxes for specific firms or 
industries. This allows government to target those firms which will distribute higher 
potential benefits (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 15). However, this assumes that 
government has perfect information and can correctly identify which firms will be 
most beneficial, which is unrealistic. Allowing the market to decide is more likely to 
produce optimal host country benefits. Secondly those foreign investors not offered 
preferential treatment may refuse to invest as a result and lastly such a discretionary 
system invites corruption.  
UNCTAD (1995) illustrates just how high and costly fiscal incentives can be. They 
report that between 1983 and 1995, ranged from US$14 000 per job, up to an 
astounding US$254 000 per job for Volkswagen and Ford investing in Setubal, 
Portugal.  
The majority of the literature finds relatively minimal effects of tax incentives on FDI 
inflows. Barlow and Wender (1955) and Robinson (1961) both conducted surveys of 
over 200 US firms. Both found that less than 20% of those surveyed listed taxes as 
an important determinant of FDI location decisions. Robinson (1961) also found an 
interesting dichotomy between the beliefs of private investors and government 
employees. Whilst the firms failed to identify taxes as important to FDI decisions, 
government listed it as the number one determinant of FDI decisions.  
“Tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good to have, but it does not help very much if 
the meal is not there (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 6).” 
In general, more recent surveys have found similar results (Fortune/Deloitte & 
Touche, 1997; Ernst & Young, 1994). If tax policy matters; it is certainly not the most 
influential factor in the site selection by multinationals. 
Historically, most econometric studies tended to support the results of surveys that 
investors are mostly influenced in their decision by market and political factors and 
that tax policy appears to have little effect on the location of FDI (Root and Ahmed, 
1978; Lim, 1983). 
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However, although relatively unimportant, this does not mean that tax incentives 
have no influence on potential foreign investment. Indeed, a number of theorists (e.g. 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 2; Kransdorff, 2010: 71) have argued that due to the 
increasing integration of global markets combined with increased liberalisation of 
financial markets, tax incentives are becoming an increasingly important 
differentiator between various potential investment location decisions. Ireland’s tax 
policy has been touted as an important factor in its ability to attract foreign 
investment over the past two decades (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 8). Indeed Hines 
(1999: 309) found that a 1 percentage point reduction in the effective tax rate would 
increase FDI by approximately 2%, assuming a base corporate tax rate of around 
30%. 
Although fiscal incentives can help to attract FDI, there a number of costs and risks 
associated with introducing such a policy programme. The most obvious and direct 
of these is the lost revenue which could have a highly detrimental effect on the 
fiscus, depending on the extent of the incentives and the level of development of the 
host country. The main loss is in the case when incentives are offered to investors 
which would have invested regardless. These free riders benefit to the detriment of 
all host country citizens (Kransdorff, 2010: 77). 
Tax incentives can also cause distortions in the long run. Some economic activities 
will be pursued simply because they are artificially more profitable because of the 
incentives and not necessarily because there is a comparative advantage. Not only 
does this encourage projects with relatively low productivity, but it also draws vital 
resources away from potentially high productivity projects and industries (Kransdorff, 
2010: 78). 
Rent-seeking and corruption are also major issues associated with fiscal incentives. 
Firms that receive large tax breaks and other advantages, will want to maintain the 
status quo and may engage in pay-offs to government officials in order to ensure that 
is the case (Kransdorff, 2010: 78; Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 22). South Africa has 
already experienced a similar case with its domestic fiscal incentive scheme. The 
former head of the small and medium Enterprise Development Program (SMEDP) 
was dismissed for alleged financial mismanagement and the programme suspended 
(Kransdorff, 2010: 78). 
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Tax incentives can also be highly complicated to administer, thus increasing 
compliance costs for the firms and the bureaucratic and administrative costs to the 
government, as well as increasing the likelihood of tax avoidance. These controls 
can also result in uncertainty and delays which increases the financial risk to 
investors and therefore reduces the attractiveness of the country as a potential 
investment location (Kransdorff, 2010: 78; Morisset and Pirnia, 2000: 22). 
Whilst fiscal incentives can help to attract foreign investment, they are costly in terms 
of foregone revenue, administrative costs and can result in distortion in the market 
as well as rent-seeking or corruption. Empirical studies have indicated that there is 
no strong link between taxes and FDI although as markets continue to integrate and 
liberalise, taxes may be becoming an increasingly important differentiator between 
potential investment locations. Nevertheless the costs of incentives appear to 
outweigh the benefits, which are virtually impossible to quantify and so resulting in 
governments offering overly generous incentives. As a result, the least costly and 
distortionary way to attract FDI through lower taxes is by maintaining a simple, lower, 
general tax rate.  
 
2.9 Global Determinants 
There are numerous factors; economic, political, and social; that influence the spatial 
distribution of FDI. The determinants of foreign Investment will vary with type of 
investment i.e. market-seeking FDI will have different determinants to efficiency-
seeking FDI. The determinants of FDI will also vary with geographical location, 
changing from country to country, region to region, situation to situation. However 
there are a number of determinants of inward FDI that tend to be universal, factors 
that are crucial to the attraction of FDI throughout the world. 
Historically, the strongest and most influential factor in attracting FDI was market 
size. Nunnenkamp (2002: 6) found that strong correlations existed between absolute 
FDI flows and market size, which has been the case for the last 50 years at least. 
Janicki and Wunnava (2004: 508) find similar results when testing a sample of 
Eastern European EU (European Union) accession candidates. 
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Tsai (1994: 139) uses a simultaneous equations model in order to capture the 
endogenous effects of FDI and growth – higher growth rate may attract more FDI, 
which fosters higher growth rate and so on. He explains that a larger market size not 
only provides a larger market of consumers for MNCs engaging in market-seeking 
FDI, but also allows for more efficient utilisation of resources and allows firms to 
exploit economies of scale.  Tsai (1994: 145) empirically finds that market size has a 
strong and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows to a given country. 
Many economists (Addison and Heshmati, 2003: 6; Noorbakhsh et al. 2001: 1602) 
have argued that globalisation and increased integration has resulted in the 
determinants of FDI changing e.g. A Multinational Corporation (MNC) may now 
invest in a country but export the products i.e. efficiency-seeking FDI. Due to the 
increased liberalisation of trade this is now affordable. In this situation the main 
determinants of trade would be wage and other input costs as well as trade 
openness as opposed to the size of the local market. Empirical evidence 
(Nunnenkamp, 2002: 35) has so far failed to support such claims and market size 
remains a crucial determinant of FDI globally. 
However one factor that has, undoubtedly grown in importance and universality is 
local skills and human capital. This is a vitally important factor in firstly attracting FDI 
and secondly taking advantage of it. Companies will only invest in a country if they 
will be able to employ people who have the necessary skills to run their business, 
otherwise there is no point. Furthermore many of the developing countries that have 
attracted the most FDI, particularly in Asia, have attracted it based on their level of 
technological innovation and levels of local skills. Noorbakhsh et.al. (2001: 1603) 
even go so far as to suggest that countries that attract FDI with low cost labour will 
attract significantly less FDI and experience significantly lower growth rates than 
countries which attract FDI due to high levels of human capital.   
Noorbakhsh et al. (2001: 1596) conduct an econometric analysis to test for the 
effects of school enrolment on FDI inflows. They find that this proxy for local skills 
and human capital is strongly and significantly positively related to FDI inflows to 
those developing countries tested in the sample. 
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Addison and Heshmati (2003: 21) find a similarly strong positive correlation between 
secondary school enrolment and FDI. They go on to show that not only is local skills 
a strong determinant of FDI, but its importance has increased over time.  
Local skills and education is not only important to attract FDI, but is also crucial for 
the host country to reap the benefits from foreign investment. MNCs may bring 
advanced capital into a country, but if the local population are unable to understand 
or use it, then it will have no benefit on the economy as a whole. Xu (2000: 491) 
estimated that a developing country needs to reach a human capital threshold of 
approximately 1.9 years (in terms of mean male secondary school attainment) in 
order to benefit from the technology transfer from US MNC affiliates. Borensztein et 
al. (1998: 125) similarly calculated a human capital threshold value required for 
developing countries to benefit from advanced technology transfer from MNCs.  
They estimated this value to be somewhat lower – at 0.51 years of mean male 
secondary school attainment. 
Dunning and Zhang (2007) argue for the relevance of institutions as a major 
determinant of FDI. These would include laws and regulations; behavioural norms 
and customs; content and quality of local innovatory systems and the protection of 
intellectual property rights; and the extent of crime and corruption and social 
dysfunction. Durham (2004: 288), for example, argues that legal heritage, specifically 
the distinction between civil law, made by legislature (e.g. France, Germany), and 
common law, made by judges (e.g. British), can explain much of the variation in the 
measures of financial development. A good legal environment will protect 
entrepreneur’s and investor’s ideas and investments thus encouraging investment as 
there is little risk of this capital being expropriated on a whim as has been evidenced 
in much of Africa, notably the Zambian mines, which have been nationalised and 
then privatised again on at least three separate occasions (van de Walle, 1989: 604). 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) and Wei (1997), amongst others, find that corruption has a 
significantly adverse effect on FDI inflows. They also find that corruption is correlated 
to other explanatory variables such as political and macroeconomic stability and thus 
corruption has an indirect effect as well as the direct effect on FDI flows. 
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Another major determinant of FDI is natural resource endowments. Developing 
countries with a rich endowment of natural resources tend to attract greater inflows 
of FDI. This is particularly true in Africa; Asiedu (2006) finds a strong correlation 
between FDI inflows and natural resources (share of minerals and oil in total exports) 
and market size for a sample of African states over time.  
Conventional wisdom is that Multinationals prefer to invest in authoritarian regimes 
as a dictator can provide MNCs with preferential entry deals because of the lack of 
populist pressure and because the repression on labour unions drives down wages. 
There is some support for this viewpoint in the literature (Rodrik, 1999). However 
Jensen (2003: 592) shows that democracy is in fact positively correlated with FDI 
inflows. The reason for this, as explained by North (1990) and North and Weingast 
(1989), is that MNCs requires property rights to be credibly enforced. Under an 
authoritarian regime there is no reason why their capital and enterprise will not be 
seized or nationalised at short notice as has been evidenced in a number of African 
states; most notably Zimbabwe and Zambia. FDI is relatively illiquid ex post and 
therefore the credibility of democratic institutions is important for MNCs to reduce 
political risk (Jensen. 2003: 593). 
Wage rates are another important factor in determining the potential location of FDI. 
For efficiency-seeking FDI, in particular, wage rates can be the defining factor in a 
Multinational’s investment decision.  
Both Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Fazekas (2005) studied the effect on FDI of 
mean wage rates in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. These nation’s 
economies are in a crucial stage of development as they shift from centrally 
controlled economies to market economies. Many of these economies shed 
numerous jobs e.g. Hungary lost 1.5 million jobs which was equivalent to 30% of the 
total employment following the collapse of the socialist economy (Fazekas, 2005: 
85). As a result wages remained very low and FDI was attracted. The inflow of FDI to 
the region created numerous employment opportunities which has helped to 
stimulate economic growth in the region. Both papers also find strong evidence of a 
negative relationship between FDI inflows and average wage rates. 
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These results are supported by a number of other cross-country, panel-data studies 
(Addison and Heshmati, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2003; Jensen, 2003) which all find 
negative correlations between FDI and average wage rates across countries. 
However, a number of authors have also argued and shown (Noorbakhsh et al, 
2001; Xu, 2000) that attracting FDI on the basis of low wage rates may be less 
beneficial to the host country than other FDI as such a country may not have the 
absorptive capacity due to low levels of FDI to take advantage of the advanced 
technology transfer from the MNC affiliates. Secondly investment in these low-wage 
industries may be less technologically advanced than others and must certainly be 
labour-intensive for them to attract FDI on the basis of low wage rates. Such 
industries are less likely to engage in significant Research and Development (R&D) 
or even, necessarily, use particularly advanced technology. 
Taxes are another important factor in the locational distribution of FDI. MNCs seek 
both lower taxes, as well as a simple and transparent and predictable tax 
environment (Carim, 1994: 12). As has been discussed previously, tax incentives 
and lower taxes can attract FDI (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003: 2; Kransdorff, 2010: 
71). However, many studies (Barlow and Wender,1955; Robinson, 1961) have found 
that tax incentives have only a minimal benefit in attracting FDI, whilst the costs can 
be exorbitant.    
Two fundamental conditions for foreign investment are profitability and investor 
confidence. Both of these are reliant on a stable political situation and 
macroeconomic policies that are consistent and transparent, and that help induce 
economic growth and encourage investment (Carim, 1994: 9). Greater political 
stability in a country will result in a higher probability of revenues being able to be 
appropriated by the multinational from sales made in that country. This effectively 
lowers the risk, which in turn allows the MNC to reduce the risk premium in the 
prices of its goods – reflected in the mark-up, which makes the MNCs more 
competitive in the local market. This will then make the location more attractive to 
FDI and so more FDI will flow into the country (Chakrabarti, 2003: 161). 
The level of protectionism or openness of a country is another key factor for foreign 
investment decisions. Openness can work in two different ways: market-seeking FDI 
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may be more encouraged to invest if there is a high degree of protection for the 
market. High tariffs and NTBs make exporting relatively more expensive and so 
making direct investment a more attractive option for MNCs. Conversely, efficiency-
seeking FDI aims to export most of its products from the host country and hence 
highly protectionist regime will have a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of 
such FDI investing in a given country (Chakrabarti, 2003: 161). 
However, both market-seeking FDI and efficiency-seeking FDI require inputs to their 
production, given that they come from outside of the host market they are more likely 
to source, at least some of, these inputs from outside the host country. In this case 
they would be required to pay the high tariffs in a highly protected market, thus 
making them less competitive and hence less profitable and attractive to investment 
(Carim, 1994: 12). 
Most studies (Addison and Heshmati, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2003; Moolman et al., 
2006) find strong evidence that the degree of openness is positively correlated with 
FDI inflows. 
There are a number of differing opinions on the effect of the exchange rate on FDI 
inflows. Chakrabati (2003: 162) argues that a stronger currency results in the profits 
made in the host country, translating into relatively higher profits overseas. He calls 
this the revenue channel. However he also identifies a cost channel, where certain 
immobile input factors will be relatively more expensive with a stronger currency. 
Therefore Chakrabati (2003: 162) argues that if the revenue channel exceeds the 
cost channel, FDI will flow into the country. Ngowi (2001: 119) argues that a country 
with a weak exchange rate will attract more FDI. Furthermore he argues that due to 
the cost of converting profits, the parent company will be more likely to reinvest 
profits locally.  
Carim (1994: 17) claims that a lower real exchange rate will reduce the costs and 
therefore make investment more attractive. Moolman et al. (2006: 24), on the other 
hand, shows that in the South African case, a depreciation of the Rand/Dollar 
exchange rate results in significantly lower FDI inflows to the country. Gastanga et 
al. (1998: 1310) tests a panel data set comprising 49 developing countries over the 
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period 1970-1995, and finds that the exchange rate has no significant effect on FDI 
inflows. 
A volatile exchange rate however, should reduce FDI. A more volatile exchange rate 
will make it much more difficult for firms to make long-term plans which are a 
fundamental part of FDI. It often takes more than 18 months from the time the 
decision to invest is made until the investment actually comes to fruition; therefore a 
widely fluctuating exchange rate and rampant inflation make it very difficult for the 
management to make informed decisions on cost structures and revenues. This 
makes the investment relatively more risky and hence will deter FDI (Fedderke and 
Romm, 2004: 8).  
The availability and reliability of infrastructure will result in higher FDI inflows. 
Foreign firms require basic infrastructure such as a road network, telephone, 
internet, electricity, water, etc. If these are not reliably and freely available, it will 
make doing business that much more difficult, inefficient and costly – resulting in 
lower investment. Asiedu (2006: 72); Moolman et al. (2006: 23); and Addison and 
Heshmati (2003: 22) all use the number of fixed line and mobile users per 100 
people as a proxy for infrastructure which, unfortunately, only captures the 
availability portion and not the reliability of the infrastructure. Both Asiedu (2006: 72) 
and Moolman et al. (2006: 23) found a strong positive correlation between FDI and 
infrastructure but Addison and Heshmati (2003: 22) report that the estimates for 
infrastructure were mostly insignificant. 
Finally, another important determinant of a country’s capacity to attract FDI depends 
on that country’s policies towards FDI. Although this may appear as an obvious 
factor in attracting FDI, many developing countries try to attract foreign investment 
yet retain strongly anti-FDI policies and legislation (IFC, 1997: 29). 
These restrictions can take many forms and are usually not aimed at restricting 
foreign investment but rather at protecting domestic firms. These restrictions include; 
restrictions on foreign ownership, forcing MNCs into JVs, with all their associated 
problems and costs; local content rules, where all products produced domestically 
must contain some percentage of locally sourced inputs; and official approval, where 
MNCs must seek official authorization which takes time and money. All of these raise 
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MNC’s costs and reduce their benefits, thus reducing the appeal of the country as a 
potential investment opportunity and so deterring FDI (IFC, 1997: 30). 
 
2.10 Africa-specific FDI 
Like many countries around the world, African nations remained sceptical about the 
benefits of FDI up until the mid-1980s, during which African states maintained high 
barriers to trade and investment, whilst following import-substitution policies in order 
to protect domestic industries. However these perceptions began to change in the 
late 1980s as countries in the region have shifted towards outward-looking 
development strategies, including attracting FDI (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 
242). 
Despite this shift in policy, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been largely unsuccessful 
in attracting investment. Over the periods 1980-1989 and 1990-1998, FDI to SSA 
grew by 59% (excluding South Africa). This is compared to 5200% in Europe and 
Central Asia and an average of 672% for all developing countries (Asiedu, 2001: 2). 
Africa’s participation in the global economy has also fallen over time, Dupasquier 
and Osake (2006: 242) report that the region’s share of world exports fell from 5.9% 
to 2.3% between 1980 and 2003. Meanwhile Africa’s share of global FDI fell from 
3.3% in 2003 to 2.7% in 2006 (Bartels et al., 2009: 248). 
The FDI flows to SSA tend to be focused in the natural resources sector. The three 
largest recipients of FDI in the region between 2000 and 2002 were South Africa, 
Nigeria and Angola, who, between them, accounted for over 65% of the total FDI 
flows into the region. All three of these countries boast significant natural resource 
endowments, with South Africa the only country in the region that has attracted 
notable investment in non-natural resource industries (Asiedu, 2006: 63). 
The fact that the majority of FDI attracted to the region goes into extractive natural 
resource industries is detrimental to the growth prospects of the region. Akinlo 
(2004) examined the effects on economic growth of FDI in extractive industries in 
Nigeria. The results show that foreign investment has an insignificant effect on 
economic growth and even that effect is only after a considerable lag. 
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There are several reasons why the growth effects of FDI are less in extractive 
natural resource sectors. The extractive sector is usually an enclave sector and 
hence has few linkages to the rest of the economy. Secondly the technology transfer 
from foreign firms to domestic ones will be less in the extractive sector as the 
technology is usually embodied in highly capital intensive production. Extractive 
industries also have large economies of scale and hence the presence of MNCs may 
crowd out domestic investment rather encourage new entrants as may occur in 
manufacturing. Lastly, backward and forward linkages are much less important in 
this sector (Akinlo, 2004: 628). 
Whilst most of the general, global determinants of FDI apply in a similar fashion to 
SSA countries, certain factors are relatively more and less important in attracting FDI 
into Africa. Asiedu (2001: 13) finds a strong negative effect on her African dummy – 
countries in Africa attract less FDI simply because they are situated in Africa. She 
ascribes this result to two possible explanations: Firstly, the region is perceived as 
being inherently risky. Haque et al. (2000) provide empirical support for this 
explanation; they find that commercial risk-rating agencies frequently rate African 
nations as riskier than is justified by their fundamentals. A second possible 
explanation derives from a lack of investor knowledge of the region. Investment 
decisions may be led by inferences about neighbouring countries rather than about 
the actual situation and conditions within the potential investment location.  
Asiedu (2001: 14-15) also finds that neither openness to trade nor higher returns on 
investment have a significant impact on FDI flows into African countries, despite 
having a significant effect on FDI inflows to non-SSA countries. This may be due to 
the relative riskiness and lack of credibility of governments in the region. Due to the 
high risk nature of the investment, higher potential returns may have very little 
additional impact on the investment. The lack of credibility of governments in the 
region means that liberalisation reform has little impact on FDI as it is not believed to 
be long-term. Previous reform in the region has tended to be ad hoc and liable to be 
reversed at a moment’s notice. 
Asiedu (2001: 16) determines that infrastructure development has little impact on 
FDI into Africa. She argues that this is due to the prevalence natural-resource based 
FDI which does not require a very high level of infrastructure development, 
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particularly with regards to the proxy of telephone lines. However in a later paper 
(Asiedu, 2006: 69), she finds that the influence of infrastructural development is a 
statistically significant determinant of FDI into Africa. Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006: 
251) also argue that the lack of supporting infrastructure is a major constraint to FDI 
to the region. 
Both political and macroeconomic instability are major constraints to investment into 
the region. The high incidence of wars and civil unrest in the region makes potential 
investment risky. The frequently changing political regimes in many states also 
means changing official attitudes and policies towards FDI, further increasing the risk 
of investment (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 250). The high levels of 
macroeconomic instability also increase uncertainty and therefore risk for investors. 
The relatively frequent currency crashes and high inflation have restricted FDI 
inflows to the region (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006: 250). 
Corruption and lack of transparent governance are also key restrictions to foreign 
investment. They increase the cost of investment as well as the uncertainty and 
undermine the rule of law. Asiedu (2006: 71) finds corruption to be strongly, 
negatively correlated with FDI inflows. 
 
2.11 South Africa FDI 
FDI inflows to South Africa have more than doubled over the last decade. Since the 
turn of the century South Africa has seen steady and significant growth in FDI 
inflows. This period has also coincided with the country’s longest period of sustained 















Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Reserve Bank (SARB) data. 
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some of those already invested in the country began to withdraw. This situation was 
further exacerbated following the Soweto riots of 1976. International sanctions were 
then placed on the country during the 1980s, meaning that investors began to leave 
in even greater numbers (Kransdorff, 2010: 72).
The political situation began to change in the early 1990s when the ruling Nationalist 
Party (NP) opened negotiations with the then banned African National Congress 
(ANC). These negotiations 
country’s history. 
 
“Please come and invest in my country
                                                     
The new governing party, the ANC, reopened the country’s borders as 
attract FDI back into the country. The policy was met with only limited success during 
the 1980s, however, since 
increases. 
Figure 5 
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it tried to 
 
 
The largest proportion of the firms during the 1990s went into Financial and Business 
services (20%) with machinery & equipment and Materials not far behind (19% and 
17% respectively). Infrastructure (12%) and Basic consumer goods (13%) were
attractive destinations (Gelb, 2002:3).
 
Figure 6 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
The US is the single most prominent country in terms of distribution of
countries, with 18.5%. As a region
(Gelb, 2002: 4). 
Bhaumik and Gelb (2005: 20) find that South Africa attracts more sophisticated 
MNCs than comparable developing countries, which spend relatively more of their 
revenues on R & D, which aids technology deve
market. The affiliates in South Africa do not constitute a significant part of the MNC’s 
worldwide operations. 
Gelb (2002: 8) also found that a much larger proportion of FDI inflows to South Africa 
is in the form of acquisitions as compared to similar developing countries. 31% of the 
firms studied were full acquisitions with another 14% partial acquisitions, this is 
Germany , 11
Rest of Europe, 34
Distribution of MNCs in SA by Home Country
 
Gelb, 2002: 4 
, however, Europe is overwhelmingly dominant
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compared to below 5% full acquisitions and about 10% partial in other countries 
studied. This may be attributed to the maturity of South Africa’s equity market and 
may indicate that a large proportion of investors view the South Africa’s asset base 
and structure as relatively similar to that which they are used to. 
Fedderke and Romm (2004) tested for the determinants of FDI into South Africa 
between 1960 and 2002. They estimated a statistically significant correlation at the 
5% level between ‘LOG of real GDP’ and FDI inflows. Their estimate of ‘labour 
capital ratio’ was also found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. Other 
statistically significant variables included average wage, corporate tax rate, a self-
constructed property rights index, a self-constructed instability index and degree of 
openness to trade – exports/ GDP and imports/ GDP. 
Moolman et.al. (2006) ran a similar analysis of South Africa’s FDI inflows for the 
period 1970 – 2003. The most significant determinants of FDI for South Africa during 
this period according to this analysis included openness, which had a short term 
positive relationship on FDI as well as a long term positive relationship, market size 
was also found to be positively correlated with FDI.  
Infrastructure was estimated to have a large positive impact on FDI, with a 5% 
increase in infrastructure resulting in a 9% increase in FDI inflows in the short-run 
and was estimated to raise the long-term equilibrium value of FDI by 0.4% (Moolman 
et al. 2006: 23). 
Lastly Moolman et al. (2006: 24) estimated that the exchange rate level has a 
statistically significant relationship with FDI inflows. It was estimated that a 
depreciation of the Rand/dollar exchange rate would result in significantly lower FDI 
inflows to the country.  
Hausmann et al. (2005) conducted a comprehensive analysis on South Africa’s 
binding constraints to investment. This analysis included surveying the top 
executives at both South African and international companies about their perceptions 
of the investment environment in South Africa. It was largely on this document that 
the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) was based. They 
identified the following six major constraints to investment: 
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• Level and volatility of the real exchange rate 
• Trade policy. The panel explain that the existence of tariff protection on 
intermediate goods acts as a tax on industries using them as inputs 
• The Labour market, Problems with the relative cost and riskiness of the labour 
relationship.  
• There is a lack of skilled labourers. 
• Obstacles to structural transformation namely information externalities 




Global FDI flows have risen exponentially during the last two decades, both globally, 
as well as within South Africa. This is partly due to realisation by governments of the 
potential benefits of FDI for economic growth and development within the host 
nation. FDI can create employment and increase the country’s foreign exchange 
reserves. However the indirect effects of FDI are potentially the most valuable for the 
host country, MNCs bring new, advanced technology into the domestic market. This 
technology can then be transferred to local firms and the economy in general 
through a number of different channels. This better technology improves efficiency, 
productivity and ultimately spurs economic growth and development. 
 Governments often offer fiscal incentives in order to attract MNCs to invest in their 
country. Although such incentives can help to attract foreign investment, they are 
generally very expensive and MNCs are usually more concerned with other factors 
when investing. These other factors include market size, which is a crucial and highly 
influential determinant for market-seeking FDI; local skills/ human capital, which is a 
crucial determinant and is growing in importance. Other determinants of FDI include, 
but are not limited to, institutions, openness, exchange rate, macroeconomic and 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
A popular method of determining the determinants of investment into a country is to 
survey a number of local managers as to what the major constraints to investment 
are (e.g. Hausmann et al. 2005; de Mello. 1997). This method can prove very useful 
in that it can raise new constraints that the researcher may not have previously 
considered and it asks those actually involved in the decision making process why 
they will or will not make a specific decision. 
However there are also a number of problems with such an analysis. Firstly, this 
looks at individual problems and may not give an accurate representation of the big 
picture. Secondly the problem with surveys are that they are hypothetical and 
therefore what a person says and actually does may be two different things. Another 
important factor is that those surveyed may not actually have much say in 
investment decisions, certainly in big MNCs most investment decisions will be made 
by the parent company which will not be included in a survey. Lastly from a practical 
viewpoint, such a survey is expensive to conduct and similar surveys are conducted 
relatively frequently by a number of organisations, therefore conducting another will 
not add significantly to the present literature (Morgan and Sonquist. 1963: 417; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan. 2001: 68). 
For these reasons it is better to look at FDI decisions historically – to see what MNCs 
have actually done in terms of investing and then try to postulate that the same 
determinants will hold in the future as well. For these reasons this paper includes a 




A high proportion of time series data are non-stationary. A process is weakly 
stationary if its mean and variance are constant over time and the value of the 
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covariance between two time periods depends only on the distance or gap between 
the two time periods and not the actual time at which the covariance is computed. It 
is important to distinguish between stationary and non-stationary time series data 
because if a time series is non-stationary, we can study its behaviour only for the 
period under consideration and can make no future predictions. Furthermore all the 
usual statistical tests and measures, such as t-stats, F-stats and R² are not 
applicable in a non-stationary time series due to non-standard distributions (Gujarati, 
2003: 803).  
Therefore the first task is to test each dataset for stationarity. It is possible to use 
graphical analysis or a sample correlogram to test for stationarity, however both of 
these methods rely to some degree on the subjective opinion of the researcher. 
Therefore the accepted method in the literature (see Fedderke and Romm (2003); 
Moolman et al. (2006)) is to use a unit root test, specifically the Dickey-Fuller unit 
root test. The Dickey-Fuller method, tests for correlation between the time series at 
time t and the time series at time t-1.  
Yt = ρYt-1 + µt                                                                                           (1) 
If these are perfectly correlated i.e. the estimated coefficient on the lagged variable, 
ρ, is 1, then we have a unit root and hence the series is non-stationary. In practice Yt-
1 is subtracted from both sides of the equation giving us: 
Yt – Yt-1 = ρYt-1 – Yt-1 + µt = (ρ – 1)Yt-1 + µt,                                              (2) 
This can also be written as: 
∆Yt = σYt-1 + µt                                                                                          (3) 
Where σ = (ρ – 1) and ∆ is the first-difference operator. Therefore we can run this 
regression and test the null hypothesis that σ = 0 and ρ = 1. If the null hypothesis is 
accepted then the series is non-stationary (Gujarati, 2003: 818; Davidson and 
Mackinnon, 2004: 614).  
The statistics used to test the null hypothesis are called the tau statistics. These are 
calculated by dividing the estimated coefficient by its standard error. The critical 
values were estimated by Messrs Dickey and Fuller. The Dickey Fuller test is 
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estimated in three different forms under three different null hypotheses each with its 
own critical values. 
Yt is a random walk:    
∆Yt = σYt-1 + µt                                                                                                (4) 
Yt is a random walk with drift:  
∆Yt = β1 + σYt-1 + µt                                                                                          (5) 
Yt is a random walk with drift around a stochastic trend:  
∆Yt = β1 + β2T + σYt-1 + µt                                                                                                                       (6) 
If the critical value exceeds the calculated absolute tau value then the we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis and it can be concluded that the series is non-stationary. 
A fourth test is the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The DF test assumes no 
correlation in the µt. When the µt are correlated the ADF test is used. The ADF test 
augments the DF test by adding lagged values of the dependent variable ∆Yt:  
∆Yt = β1 + β2T + σYt-1 + αiΣ
m
i=1 ∆Yt-I + εt                                                                   (7) 
Where εt is a white noise error term and  ∆Yt-1 = (Yt-1 – Yt-2), ∆Yt-2 = (Yt-2 – Yt-3), etc 
(Gujarati, 2003: 818). 
The results of the four Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for each of the variables are 
presented in the appendix in Table 1 on page 83. Most of the variables were found to 
be non-stationary data series, therefore creating a problem for analysis. One way to 
overcome the problem of non-stationarity is to take the first difference of the 
variables; in most cases this eradicates the non-stationarity. However the major 
problem with this method is that most economic theory is based on interactions 
between variables in level form and not in first-differenced form, furthermore it can 
make the interactions between variables significantly more difficult to interpret 
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3.3 Engle Granger Test for Cointegration 
The second way to overcome the problem of non-stationarity is through the concept 
of cointegration. Cointegration is based on the premise that two or more non-
stationary variables which have a long-run relationship will give stationary results for 
a linear combination of variables when regressed on each other (Gujarati, 2003: 
823). 
There are two ways to test for cointegration. The Engle-Granger tests for stationarity 
in the estimated error term of the cointegrating regression. It uses a very similar 
methodology to the Dickey-Fuller tests described above except that the time series 
tested is the estimated residuals from the cointegrating equation: 
∆µt = σµt-1 + εt                                                                                             (8) 
The tau test is then conducted in the same manner although the critical values are 
slightly different to the DF critical values (Gujarati, 2003: 825; Verbeek, 2004: 318). 
The absolute calculated tau values from the Engle Granger test for the six time 
series regressions range between 6.543 and 10.765, which are all statistically 
significantly higher than the critical value of 4.32 at the 1% level. This suggests that 
the series of estimated residuals is stationary and therefore all the regressions are 
cointegrating and are not spurious. Furthermore this result indicates that there is a 
long-run relationship between FDI inflows and the set of explanatory variables. 
The advantage of the Engle-Granger method is that it is simpler and easier to 
understand and because it is widely used by practitioners specifically in a macro-
modelling context (Moolman et al. 2006). However Johansen’s method is a newer 
technique and overcomes the problem of multiple cointegrating relationships. Both 
methods yield the same long-run relationship in the case where the Johansen test 
shows that only one cointegrating vector is present amongst the variables included in 
the test. 
If we assume a fairly standard simultaneous equation model in its structural form: 
Yt = α0 + α1Xt + α2Yt-1 + µt                                                                                   (9) 
Xt = β0 + β1Yt-1 + β2Xt-1 + µt                                                                                 (10) 
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The corresponding reduced form model would be the following: 
Yt = π10 + π11Yt-1 + π12Xt-1 + vit                                                                             (11) 
Xt = π20 + π21Yt-1 + π22Xt-1 + v2t                                                                            (12) 
A distinctive property of the reduced form model is that all its endogenous variables 
are expressed in terms of lagged endogenous variables only. This model constitutes 
a ‘vector autoregressive model of order 1’, because the highest lag length of its 
variables is one, denoted by VAR(1) (Seddighi et al. 2000). 
A VAR(k) model written is matrix form is as follows: 
Yt = δ + A1Yt-1 +\+ AkYt-k + vt = δ + Σ
k
j=1AjYt-j +vt                        (13) 
Where Yt is a n X 1 matrix, k is the lag length, δ deterministic terms and vt an error 
term. 
This can be rewritten as  
∆Yt = Σ
k-1
j=1rj ∆Yt-j + πYt-k+1 + vt + δ                                              (14) 
Where π = αβ 
α is referred to as the loading matrix, containing the short-run dynamics, while β is 
the matrix containing the long-run equilibrium (cointegrating) relationships. The rank, 
r, of the matrix represents the number of cointegrating vectors and is tested using 
Johansen’s method, using the standard trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics 
(Fedderke and Romm, 2004: 15).  
There are two major drawbacks to Johansen’s method. Firstly it is difficult to interpret 
the results. Secondly one has to model all the variables at the same time, which will 
be a problem if the relation of some variable is flawed and may give bias to the 
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3.4 Error Correction Mechanism 
The Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) corrects for disequilibrium in the 
cointegrating relationship. The Granger representation theorem states that if two 
variables are cointegrated, then the relationship can be expressed as ECM in 
equation (9) as: 
∆Yt = α0 +α1∆Xt + α2µt-1 + εt                                                                            (15) 
This equation states that ∆Yt depends on ∆Xt and also on the equilibrium error term. 
If α2 is statistically different from zero then it means that Yt does not adjust fully to 
changes in Xt in the same time period. α1 can be interpreted as the short-run effect of 
Xt on Yt whilst the cointegrating equation gives the long-term effects of the Xs on Yt. 
This effect also holds for the multivariate regression (Seddighi et al, 2000: 286). 
 
3.5 Panel Data Techniques 
“A panel data set contains repeated observations over the same units (in this case 
sectoral FDI), collected over a number of time periods (Verbeek, 2004: 341).” 
There are a number of advantages of using panel data in economic analysis: 
- As the data relates to the same units over time, there is certain to be 
heterogeneity in these units. Panel data techniques can take this 
heterogeneity explicitly into account (Gujarati, 2003: 637). 
- Panel data is not just suitable for capturing or explaining why units behave 
differently but also models why a given unit behaves differently during 
different time periods (Verbeek, 2004: 342). 
- Panel data, due to its greater scope captures and models certain effects that 
are not captured in a pure time series or cross-sectional model (Gujarati, 
2003: 638). 
- Lastly, more specific to this study, using panel data creates a much larger 
sample. As both cross-sectional and time-series data is included, there are 
many more observations. Much of the South African data is only reliable and 
complete since the early 1990s. A pure time-series analysis for such a short 
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period would not allow for a complete multivariate analysis due to the lack of 
degrees of freedom hence Panel data overcomes this problem. 
There are two major panel data techniques: fixed effects and random effects. The 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) is because, although the intercept may be different 
across units, each unit intercept does not vary over time, it is time invariant. To allow 
for the fixed effect intercept to vary between units, dummy variables are introduced, 
in particular differential intercept dummies (Gujarati, 2003: 642). 
 The Random Effects Model (REM) assumes that the dummy variables actually 
represent a lack of knowledge about the true model. REM proposes to express this 
‘ignorance’ through the error term (Gujarati, 2003: 647). 
The appropriate model for this panel data regression will be the fixed effects model 
(FEM). The FEM makes use of dummy variables to test for the different effects of 
each specific factor over time. It is also possible to create a dummy variable for each 
specific year in order to test for the fixed time effects; however it will be more 
appropriate in this case to introduce a trend variable in order to test for the time 
effect for two main reasons. Firstly, the effect of a specific year on FDI inflows is 
neither particularly interesting nor instructive to our analysis, we are more interested 
in the trend of FDI over time – whether it is increasing or decreasing over time. 
Secondly introducing dummy variables for each specific year will significantly erode 
the number of degrees of freedom, which was one of the initial reasons for 
undertaking the panel data analysis, and, apart from a few exceptions, the individual 
year dummies are unlikely to be statistically significantly different from each other. 
The FEM model is the appropriate panel data model to use in this analysis due to the 
fact that we have the entire population of sectors in the model – the individuals in the 
sample are ‘one of a kind’, and therefore cannot be modelled as a random draw from 
an underlying population as is the case with REM. We are not testing for a larger 
population mean as in the Random Effects Model (REM) but rather for the individual 
differences in investment between sectors (Verbeek, 2004: 351). 
The theoretical FEM model is as follows: 
Yit = α1 + αiDi + βiXit + µit                                                    (16) 
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Where Yt is FDI inflows, Di is the dummy variable for each specific sector of the 
economy, it takes a value of 1 for that sector and 0 otherwise; and Xit are all the 
explanatory variables over space and time (Gujarati. 2003: 311).  
 
3.6 Statistical Problems and Tests 
The sample size is 48 with a total of 12 explanatory variables leaving 36 degrees of 
freedom. The sample size is not particularly large and is therefore vulnerable to 
small-sample biases and distortions. However the data only goes back as far as 
1960 and although small, the sample-size is not tiny. It should be large enough in 
order to do some meaningful analysis. Gujarati (2003: 356) defines a large sample 
as being 40-50 observations and Moolman et al. (2006) and Fedderke et al. (2004) 
both run similar regressions with even smaller samples. Therefore the relatively 
small sample is something that needs to be kept cognisant, but should not be a 
major problem. 
There are a number of potential statistical problems with any econometric 
regression. These include perfect multicollinearity, autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Should any of these be present in a given regression, they may 
render it spurious and therefore unusable. Hence it is important to understand each 
problem and then correct for it, should it be present in the regression. 
 
3.6.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when there is a linear correlation between two or more of the 
explanatory variables in a regression model (Gujarati, 2003: 341). This results in the 
estimators having large variances hence making precise estimation difficult. The t 
stats of some of the coefficients tend to be incorrectly reported as statistically 
insignificant. The R2, the overall goodness of fit, can also be incorrectly reported as 
very high. Thus the presence of multicollinearity can result in distorted regression 
results. 
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There are a number of different methods to test for multicollinearity. The first 
evidence of multicollinearity being present is very high R2 while there are very few 
statistically significant t-stats (Gujarati, 2003: 359). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) increases as the collinearity of Xj on the remaining 
regressors increases. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10, which 
will happen if R²j exceeds 0.9, that variable is said to be highly collinear (Gujarati, 
2003: 360). 
A third test for multicollinearity is high pair-wise correlations among regressors. If the 
pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regressors is high, >0.8, 
then multicollinearity is a serious problem (Gujarati, 2003: 362). 
There are a number of potential solutions to the problem of multicollinearity. The first 
is to drop collinear variables from the model. However one has to be very careful 
when dropping variables. The model is based on economic theory and so dropping 
variables to get rid of multicollinearity is not based on economic theory and is 
therefore ideologically unsound. Furthermore it can cause specification bias which is 
a more serious problem than multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003: 364).  
Another potential solution is to transform the data by first-differencing the variables 
and then running those variables in the regression. However, the economic theory is 
based on the variables being in level form and therefore using first-differenced 
variables would not provide and easily interpreted result (Gujarati, 2003: 364). 
The final solution would be to find and use new data. This would be the best solution. 
Unfortunately this is the data for the period and there is no other data for the period 
in South Africa. Better proxies, particularly for skills, may help the problem but finding 
this data is unfortunately not possible either as explained previously (Gujarati, 2003: 
364). 
Blanchard suggests that econometricians might do nothing if multicollinearity is 
present as every remedy for multicollinearity has a drawback of some sort and the 
cure may be worse than disease (Gujarati, 2003: 363).   
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3.6.2 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation occurs when the error terms are correlated i.e. there is a systematic 
pattern among the residuals. Autocorrelation will result in the coefficient estimates 
being inefficient. The usual t and F test are no longer valid and the R² will be 
incorrect (Verbeek, 2004: 97).  
The first test for autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson d test. If the reported d statistic 
is equal to 2 then there is no autocorrelation present in the model. The d test, 
however, has a couple of drawbacks. If it falls in the ‘indecisive zone’, one cannot 
conclude whether or not autocorrelation is present. Secondly if the model contains 
lagged values, the d stat is often around 2 even if autocorrelation is present. 
Furthermore the d stat only identifies first order AR(1) autocorrelation (Gujarati, 
2003: 467; Verbeek, 2004: 102).  
The Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test is another test for autocorrelation and is considered 
more general than the Durbin-Watson d test as it allows for nonstochastic regressors 
such as lagged values, higher-order autoregressive schemes and simple or higher 
order moving averages of white noise error terms (Gujarati, 2003: 472).  
 
3.6.3 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity is another violation of the classical linear regression model and 
means that the disturbances µi do not all have the same variance. In the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the coefficient estimates are inefficient, making precise 
estimation difficult. Hence persisting with the usual testing procedures despite 
heteroskedasticity being present, may lead to misleading results and inferences 
(Gujarati, 2003: 394; Verbeek, 2004: 82). 
White’s test is a widely used method to establish whether heteroskedasticity is 
present in the regression model. The test entails first estimating the residuals µi. 
Then an auxiliary regression is run in which the squared residuals from the original 
regression are regressed on the original regressors. Under the null hypothesis that 
there is no heteroskedasticity, the sample size (n) multiplied by the R2 from the 
auxiliary regression follows the chi-square distribution (Gujarati, 2003: 413; Verbeek, 
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2004: 92). If the calculated test statistic exceeds the critical value, then we reject the 
null-hypothesis of constant error variance and conclude that there is 
heteroscedasticity.  If not, then we do not reject the null-hypothesis and conclude 
that there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity.   
White also provides a remedial measure in order to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
This procedure allows statistical inferences to be made about the true coefficient 
values (Gujarati, 2003: 417). 
 
3.7 Econometric Model 
The econometric model used is a time series model which includes a number of 
hypothesised determinants of FDI inflows into South Africa. GDPt-1 provides a proxy 
for market size as the size of the potential market is an important factor in MNC’s 
decisions on where to invest. The end of the Apartheid system caused a 
fundamental change in South Africa’s economy and therefore the change in regime 
had a large impact on potential FDI into the country, hence an Apartheid dummy is 
included in the model. Openness to trade is a strong complimentary factor to FDI 
inflows – it acts as a proxy for the openness of the country to investment, whilst 
openness to trade in itself is also an important determining factor for efficiency-
seeking FDI. Government Expenditure indicates the degree of state intervention 
within the economy; if too low, then essential and basic services will not be provided 
thus deterring potential FDI, however, if government expenditure is too high then this 
indicates a high level of government intervention in the economy – also a deterrent 
to potential FDI. The exchange rate is important to potential investors as its relative 
strength will impact on the cost of potential investment as well as the value of 
repatriated profits. A more volatile exchange rate makes long term planning, 
generally an important dynamic in foreign investment, that much more difficult. 
Similarly macroeconomic instability creates uncertainty and therefore increases the 
risk to investors; The ALSI volatility proxies this effect. Infrastructure is crucial to all 
business endeavours. The higher the infrastructure within a country, the more likely, 
MNCs will be willing to invest in that country. Lastly the trend captures the effect of 
the world’s general move towards greater integration and globalisation. FDI has 
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been increasing over time and some of this increase is due to a general global 
movement toward free market ideology as well as the increase in technology over 
time, which makes communication and transportation cheaper and easier.  
The econometric model that will be used in this model is as follows: 
lnFDIt = β0 + β1lnGDPt-1 + β2ADt + β3OPENt-1 + β4GEXPt + β5EXCHt + β6EXCHVt +  
β7JSEVt + β8INFt + β9Tt + µt                         (17) 
Where the natural log of real annual Foreign Direct Investment inflows into South 
Africa in the current period (lnFDIt) is the dependent variable. A Log-linear model is 
used as the estimated coefficients are easier to interpret intuitively than in a linear 
model as they indicate percentage change in FDI rather than absolute change. The 
variable does not include portfolio flows and is adjusted to constant 2005 prices and 
is measured in millions of Rand. The data is sourced directly from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB). 
 
3.8 Independent Variables 
 
3.8.1 Market Size (lnGDPt-1) 
Annual GDP is a proxy for market size, therefore it would be expected that the higher 
real GDP is the higher FDI inflows will be. Therefore the relationship between these 
two variables is expected to be positive. Similarly the relationship between economic 
growth and FDI would be expected to be positive (Nunnenkamp, 2002: 6; Janicki 
and Wunnava, 2004: 508). If growth is higher then GDP will also be higher meaning 
growing market size, furthermore, economic growth indicates political and economic 
stability and countries that exhibit high growth rates tend to implement policies that 
attract FDI. The GDP data in this model is sourced from the SARB and is adjusted to 
2005 prices and measured in millions of Rands. This variable is logged and lagged. 
The variable is logged so as to work in percentages rather than absolute figures as it 
makes is more intuitive to explain  the effect of a percentage change in GDP, rather 
than a absolute change. The variable is lagged by one period as any potential 
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investor would only be aware of GDP for the previous year and hence that is the 
valid measure. Braga Nonnenberg and Cardoso de Mendonca (2005) showed in 
their panel data analysis of 38 countries that GNP growth rates in the previous 
period were significantly positively correlated with FDI flows in the current period but 
not GNP growth in the current period. 
3.8.2 Apartheid Dummy (AD) 
South Africa’s political landscape saw a major change in 1994. Prior to that year all 
non-white citizens were excluded from voting and therefore from society and the 
economy in any real sense. As a result numerous countries imposed sanctions on 
South Africa. Furthermore the nature of the government and constitution changed 
between the two time periods. Prior to 1994 South Africa was considered an 
undemocratic country and there was a relatively high political risk associated with 
investments into South Africa due to ongoing conflicts arising from the suppression 
of non-whites. 
North (1990) found a positive relationship between the presence of and degree of 
democracy and FDI, whilst Asiedu (2006) finds a strong negative correlation 
between political turmoil and FDI. The Apartheid dummy will capture the 
fundamental change that occurred in South Africa in 1994, which will include the 
effects described by North and Asiedu. We would therefore expect higher FDI 
inflows to be related with the post-1994 period. 
The base category for the dummy variable is defined as the period prior to 1994. 
Therefore the dummy variable takes on a value of 0 for the period 1961-1993 and a 
value of 1 for the period 1994-2008. A second regression will also test the impact of 
the period of ‘maximum closure’ between 1980 and 1993 as suggested by Fedderke 
and Romm (2004: 25). This was the period of most significant and formal trade and 
investment sanctions against South Africa and hence may be more appropriate than 
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3.8.3 Openness to Trade (OPENt-1) 
Openness to trade is an important determinant of FDI inflows and is growing in 
importance over time. Openness to trade gives a good idea as to how open a 
country is to foreign capital i.e. if a country has very few barriers to trade then it is 
likely that it will have few barriers to capital, therefore making it easier and cheaper 
for FDI inflows. Furthermore in the more recent past, more multinationals have 
begun to focus on exporting. Previously FDI was generally focused on the local 
market, however increasingly, FDI looks to export, and therefore low barriers to trade 
are important for any potential FDI (Addison and Heshmati. 2003). The openness 
variable is lagged one period and is calculated as (exports + imports)/GDP. The data 
is sourced from the SARB. 
 
3.8.4 Government Expenditure (GEXPt) 
National government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is another important 
factor for MNCs when determining investment. We would expect the relationship 
between government expenditure and FDI to be an inverted U shape. MNCs require 
that government expenditure is at a reasonable level in order to suitably provide the 
required public goods, good business environment, infrastructure etc. that are 
required to effectively conduct business. However firms are generally averse to a 
high level of government expenditure as this indicates a high level of government 
intervention in the economy and higher taxes. 
 
3.8.5 Macroeconomic Stability (JSEVt) 
Macroeconomic stability is an important determinant of FDI inflows. Stability reduces 
the risk of investment and allows for profits to be successfully appropriated by MNCs 
(Chakrabarti, 2003: 161; Carim, 1994: 9). Inflation is frequently used in econometric 
analyses as a proxy for monetary discipline and macroeconomic stability. A high 
inflation rate suggests lack of discipline on the part of policymakers and makes it 
more difficult to do business. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) found that the rate 
of inflation was significantly negatively correlated to FDI inflows. However, as many 
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of the variables, including FDI, GDP and Government Expenditure, are already 
corrected for inflation, introducing inflation as an independent variable would create a 
specification error. Hence I have included a measure of volatility from the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All-Share Index (ALSI) as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability or lack thereof. The variable is calculated as the sum of the 
squared differences between ALSI each month for a specific year i.e. (Jan – Feb)2 + 
(Feb – Mar)2 + ... + (Nov-Dec)2. Due to the increasing index values over time, the 
calculated volatility will naturally increase over time, hence in order for the values to 
be comparable over time, this calculated volatility measure will then be calculated as 
a proportion of the end of year All Share Index, in this way controlling for the impact 
of inflationary pressures. This then measures the volatility in the ALSI which is a 
proxy for the economy as a whole. The data was sourced directly from the JSE.  
 
3.8.6 Exchange Rate (EXCHt) and Exchange Rate Volatility (EXCHVt) 
There are a number of differing opinions on the effect of the exchange rate on FDI 
inflows. Chakrabati (2003) argues that a stronger currency results in the profits made 
in South Africa translating into relatively higher profits overseas. He calls this the 
revenue channel. However he also identifies a cost channel, where certain immobile 
input factors will be relatively more expensive with a stronger currency. Therefore 
Chakrabati (2003) argues that if the revenue channel exceeds the cost channel, FDI 
will flow into the country. Ngowi (2001) argues that a country with a weak exchange 
rate will attract more FDI. Furthermore he argues that due to the cost of converting 
profits, the parent company will be more likely to reinvest profits locally. The 
exchange rate data is sourced from the SARB. 
A volatile exchange rate however, should reduce FDI. A more volatile exchange rate 
has a similar effect to higher inflation, in that it makes it much more difficult for firms 
to make long-term plans which are a fundamental part of FDI. It often takes more 
than 18 months from the time the decision to invest is made until the investment 
actually comes to fruition; therefore a widely fluctuating exchange rate and rampant 
inflation make it very difficult for the management to make informed decisions on 
cost structures and revenues. This makes the investment relatively more risky and 
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hence will deter FDI. Exchange rate volatility is calculated as the difference between 
the exchange rate in two consecutive periods squared. 
 
3.8.7 Infrastructure (INFt) 
A higher quality and more extensive infrastructure is likely to result in higher FDI 
inflows. Foreign firms require basic infrastructure such as a road network, telephone, 
internet, electricity, water, etc. If these are not reliably and freely available, it will 
make doing business that much more difficult, inefficient and costly resulting in lower 
investment.  Moolman et al. (2006) found that a 5 per cent increase in infrastructure 
(using the proxy of number fixed telephone subscribers per 100 citizens) increases 
FDI by approximately 9 percent in the short-term. In this analysis the number of fixed 
line and mobile users per 100 people will be used as a proxy for infrastructure. 
Telephone subscribers are a commonly used proxy for infrastructure in the literature 
(see Asiedu, 2006) and are therefore appropriate in this analysis. The data is 
courtesy of the World Bank’s world development indicators. 
 
3.9 Panel Data Model 
As explained previously, the advantage of introducing the panel-data model is 
twofold. Firstly the model allows me to test for sector-specific determinants of FDI – it 
will give an idea as to which sectors in the South African economy attract relatively 
more FDI, ceteris paribus. Secondly, the panel data model contains significantly 
more degrees of freedom which allow the model to focus purely on the determinants 
of FDI since 1994 (and the end of Apartheid). The data is more complete and reliable 
during this, more recent period, whilst it is also expected that due to the fundamental 
change in the political environment and hence the economic environment, the 
determinants of FDI may be different post-1994, compared to the determinants pre-
1994. Three additional variables are also added to this model, as compared to the 
time series model, due simply to their limited availability prior to 1990. These three 
variables include; education, which is a very important determinant of FDI – if a host 
country does not have available skills, then MNCs will not be able to produce within 
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that country and hence will not invest; labour productivity; and labour costs. The cost 
and productivity of labour is also crucially important to MNCs as these variables 
impact directly on their production costs and hence profit margins.  
lnFDIit = α0 + α1SD2 + α2SD3 + α3SD4 + α4SD5 + α5SD6 + α6SD7 + α7SD8 + α8SD9 +  
β1lnGSPit-1 + β3LABPit+ β4LABCit+ β6EXCHit + β7EXCHVit + β8GEXPit + β9JSEVit + 
β10INFit + β11EDUCit + β12Tit + µt                                                                           (18) 
In this model SD stands for Sectoral dummy and captures the differential effects of 
specific sector on FDI into that sector. 
SD1 is not included in the model to avoid falling into the dummy variable trap of 
perfect multicollinearity. SD1 is therefore the base category and α0 captures the 
constant for SD1 whilst α1 to α8 capture the respective difference from the base 
category of their respective sectors. 
SD1 – Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing 
SD2 – Mining and Quarrying 
SD3 – Manufacturing 
SD4 – Electricity, Gas and Water 
SD5 – Construction 
SD6 – Wholesale and Retail trade, Catering and Accommodation 
SD7 – Transport, Storage and Communication 
SD8 – Financial Intermediation, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 
SD9 – Community, Social and Personal services 
 
3.9.1 GDP by Economic Activity (GSP) 
This variable measures real output from each economic activity and serves the same 
purpose as GDP in the previous model – a proxy for the size of the market in each 
specific sector. This data is courtesy of the SARB. 
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3.9.2 School Enrolment (EDUCt) 
Another vital determinant of FDI is skills and education levels. Companies will only 
invest in a country if they will be able to employ people who have the necessary 
skills to run their business, otherwise there is no point. Furthermore many of the 
developing countries that have attracted the most FDI, particularly in Asia, have 
attracted it based on their level of technological innovation and levels of local skills 
(Noorbakhsh et.al, 2001). Unfortunately, complete and reliable data for any proxy for 
skills/education is not available for South Africa prior to 1990. The most complete 
data available is on percentage of children enrolled in secondary education. This 
gives a relatively good measure of skills/ education, although should be lagged at 
least 5 years as this is how long secondary school takes. The data is courtesy of the 
World Bank’s development indicators. 
 
3.9.3 Labour Productivity (LABP) and labour Costs (LABC) 
Labour costs and productivity are another important determinant of FDI, particularly 
for efficiency-seeking FDI. Both Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Fazekas (2005) 
found a strong correlation between wage costs and FDI in Eastern European 
countries. These results are supported by a number of other cross-country, panel-
data studies (Addison and Heshmati, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2003; Jensen, 2003) which 
all find negative correlations between FDI and average wage rates across countries. 
The data is sourced from the SARB’s quarterly bulletins. This reported data is 
calculated from basic data provided by Statistics South Africa, and originates from 
ongoing Surveys of Employment and Earnings. 
The data is calculated relative to other years. So both Labour Productivity as well as 
Labour Costs is calculated relative to the year 2000, in which both variables are 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Time Series Model 
The regression was run with the dependent variable, annual FDI inflows, in natural 
logged form. The Log-linear model’s coefficients are easier to interpret intuitively. 
The results are presented in Table 1 on page 58. 
 
4.1.1 Multicollinearity 
The R2 from all the regressions is above 0.95, however, a number of the coefficient 
estimates within all the regressions are statistically significant. Nevertheless there 
are also a number of estimates within the regressions that are not statistically 
significant. Hence based on the R2 stat and t-stats it is not clear whether 
multicollinearity is present within the time series model. 
The second test for multicollinearity is the VIF test. The VIF stats for almost all of the 
variables in all the regressions remain below the critical level of ten. In regression 2, 
the VIF for Openness and LaglnGDP both exceed ten. Whilst in regression 4, the 
VIF for Openness and Infrastructure both exceed ten. However all other variables 
VIF stats in all the other regressions, remain below ten. 
The correlation matrix indicates only two instances of high pairwise correlations, 
above 0.8. Firstly the pairwise correlation between Government Expenditure and 
LaglnGDP, and secondly between Openness and the Sanctions dummy. Both of 
these relationships are easy to interpret: a higher GDP would mean that 
governments will likely earn more revenue and so be able to spend more. The 
second link shows that exports and imports to and from South Africa declined when 
sanctions were imposed. All other pairwise correlations are below 0.8. 
These results indicate that while there is some limited evidence of multicollinearity 
within the time series model, particularly between specific variables, this is not a 
major problem in the model and that, as Blanchard suggests, doing nothing is the 
best solution in this case, as other solutions will almost certainly result in a 
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misspecification of the model. Furthermore all coefficient estimates have the correct 
signs – further indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem in the model. 
 
4.1.2 Autocorrelation 
The reported d-stat in this model ranges between 1.4987 and 1.7543 for the different 
regressions, suggesting no autocorrelation. 
The BG test critical values follow the chi-square distribution. In this model the 
calculated BG statistic is 1.596 which is significantly lower than the critical value of 
11.8076 at the 5% level of significance. This means that we can accept the null 
hypothesis that no autocorrelation is present in this model. 
 
4.1.3 Heteroskedasticity 
Within the time series regression model, the calculated test statistics from White’s 
test range from 8.754 and 14.422, which are all below the critical chi-squared value 
at the 10% level of statistical significance. We can therefore conclude that 
heteroskedasticity is not a major problem in this model 
 
4.1.4 F-Stat 
The reported F statistics for the models are all well in excess of the critical F-stat, 
with all being significant at the 1% level of significance, indicating that the regressors 
as a whole fit the model very well and together are highly statistically significantly 





Table 1 . Time Series Regression Results
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Name Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat)
Ln GDP Lagged 3.28386*** (7.74) 2.522271*** (3.90) 3.44334*** (9.42) 4.48607*** (8.56) 1.6667452*** ( 3.24) 1.435672*** (3.24)
Apartheid Dummy  1.032119*** (3.89) 0.507543* (1.94) 0.2842389 (1.21)
Sanctions Dummy 0.3376782* (1.79)  0.46933*** (3.93)
Openness lagged 0.0430963*** (3.26) 0.0122772 (1.02) 0.0003154 (0.02) 0.00911245 (0.79)  0.0195234** (2.38)
GVT Expenditure -0.1077244*** (-1.94) -0.0272959 (-0.82) -0.111632*** (-3.55) -0.0499782** (-2.38) -0.063277*** (-2.76)
Exchange Rate 0.173512*** (3.82) 0.2891253*** (7.70) 0.0756478* (1.57)  0.1212346** (2.42) 0.1144672** (2.31)
Exchange Rate Volatility  -0.0201335 (-0.63) -0.0837166 (-1.56) -0.0528954 (-1.54)  -0.084461 (-1.34) -0.0222567 (-0.76) -0.020167 (-0.72)
ALSI Volatility -0.0000749 (0.48) -0.0002587* (-1.87) -0.000272* (-1.89)  -0.000169 (-1.14) -0.000222** (-2.13) -0.0002342** (-2.14)
Infrastructure .0093264*** (2.87) 0.0070235* (1.85) 0.0075244** (2.59)  0.0061245* (1.89)  .0042659 (1.57)
Trend  0.0598721** (2.59)  0.0790752*** (4.70)
Constant  -21.37021*** (-7.65) -28.32304*** ( -4.03) -9.628184* (-1.76) -15.34567*** (-8.06)  -17.23194** (-2.42) -11.41388* (-1.89)
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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4.1.5 Real GDP 
The variable used as a proxy for market size is lagged Ln GDP. This would be the 
reported real GDP for the previous period, logged, and therefore the most recent 
data a potential investor would have on market size. In all six regressions the 
coefficient estimate is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. All estimates are 
positive, therefore postulating, as expected, a strong positive relationship between. 
The results indicate that a 1% increase in real GDP results in an increase between 
1.4% and 4.5% the following year. 
The results from the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model (See Appendix, Table 2 on 
page 84) are similar. In all three regressions, the coefficient estimates for LnLagGDP 
are all positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.  
The Error Correction Model (ECM) suggests that in the short term the increase in 
FDI inflows due to changes in GDP is statistically significantly lower than in the long 
run. The ECM estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. The model indicates 
that a 1% increase in GDP results in only a 1.2% increase in FDI inflows in the 
immediate term.  
 
4.1.6 Apartheid/ Sanctions Dummy 
The Estimated coefficients for the Apartheid Dummy are statistically significant at the 
10% level of significance, in 2 out the 3 regressions in which the dummy variable 
was included. In both cases, the estimates indicate that there was a significant 
increase in FDI inflows into South Africa following the end of Apartheid. The results 
of the VAR model concur with these results. The coefficient estimate for the 
Apartheid Dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The Sanctions Dummy tests the effect of Sanctions on South African FDI inflows, 
between the period of 1980-1993, generally regarded as the period of most closure 
due to political sanctions on trade and investment into South Africa by the 
International community. One of the coefficient estimates is highly significant at the 
1% level, whilst the other coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level. Both are 
positive, indicating that South Africa’s FDI inflows were lower during the period of 
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maximum closure between 1980 and 1993. The coefficient estimate for the 
Sanctions Dummy in the VAR model is also positive but is not statistically significant. 
 
4.1.7 Openness of Trade 
The variable used as a proxy for openness is imports and exports as a percentage of 
GDP, lagged one period. In only 2 out the 5 regressions in which it is included, is this 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance may 
be due, in part, to the presence of multicollinearity, particularly between the 
Apartheid Dummy and the Sanctions Dummy. Self-evidently the impact of sanctions 
due to Apartheid would have been to decrease imports and exports and hence 
openness. This is supported by the fact that neither of these dummies is included in 
regression 6 (in which the coefficient estimate for Openness is statistically 
significant). Furthermore there is a reasonably high pairwise correlation between 
Openness and the apartheid dummy (over 0.5), whilst there is a very strong pairwise 
correlation between Openness and the Sanctions Dummy (over 0.8). 
The coefficient estimate is positive in all regressions which indicates that there is a 
positive correlation between levels of trade openness and FDI inflows. As explained 
previously, this is likely due to the fact that an open trade regime indicates an open 
approach to money and goods entering and leaving the country and that many 
MNCs look to export their products.  
The coefficient estimates for the Openness variable in VAR model are statistically 
significant at the 5% level in 2 out of the 3 regressions. In all cases the Openness 
coefficient estimate is positive. As explained previously, this is likely due to the fact 
that an open trade regime indicates an open approach to money and goods entering 
and leaving the country and that many MNCs look to export their products.  
The estimate in the ECM is not statistically significant, suggesting the impact of trade 
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4.1.8 Government Expenditure 
The coefficient estimates for government expenditure are all negative, with four out 
of the five estimates, statistically significant at the 10% level. The estimates from the 
VAR model are also negative, though not statistically significant. This suggests that if 
the previously hypothesised inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and 
government expenditure holds, then South Africa’ government expenditure is too 
high and is therefore on the downward-sloping area of the curve, and is deterring 
potential foreign investors. 
The ECM indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in the impact of 
government expenditure on FDI inflows in the long run as compared to the short 
term.  
 
4.1.9 Exchange Rate 
Two measures were used to test the effect of the exchange rate on FDI inflows. The 
absolute exchange rate’s estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 
10% level for all regressions in which the variable was included. The estimated 
coefficient on absolute exchange rate (Rand-Dollar) is positive. This indicates that as 
the Rand depreciates, FDI will increase. This result indicates that the initial costs of 
FDI are more significant to potential FDI than future profits as a weaker Rand makes 
the initial costs relatively cheaper for an MNC but the future profits relatively lower. A 
weak rand will also encourage re-investment of profits as taking them out of the 
country reduces their relative value due to the weak exchange rate. A depreciation of 
one Rand to the dollar increases FDI by between 0.07% and 0.3%. 
The coefficient estimates from the VAR model concur with these results. All three 
coefficient estimates are positive, however none of these estimates are statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
The ECM estimated coefficient is also statistically significant and significantly lower. 
This indicates that the exchange rate effect works in the long-term rather than in the 
short-term. 
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The second measure of exchange rate that is tested in the model is the exchange 
rate volatility. None of the estimated coefficients for this variable are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The sign on exchange rate volatility is negative which 
would be expected. A volatile exchange rate makes it much more difficult to plan for 
the future, estimate future profits and costs. Therefore, potential FDI is less likely to 
enter the market if it less sure of the future exchange rate. The value of the 
estimated coefficient is not easy to interpret as exchange rate volatility is calculated 
as the change in the exchange rate between two periods squared. So it is not easy 
to attach any economic meaning to the estimated coefficient. The coefficient 
estimates for exchange rate volatility are also negative within the VAR model, with 
two out of three of the estimates statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The coefficient estimate in the ECM is statistically significant, thus indicating that 
there is a difference in the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI inflows in the long 
run as compared to the short run i.e. the long-run effect on FDI inflows is greater 
than in the short run. 
 
4.1.10 ALSI Volatility 
The ALSI volatility variable is calculated as the sum of squared differences between 
the monthly ALSI indexes for the year in question and then as a proportion of the 
yearly ALSI index so as to eradicate the effects of natural growth of the index. This 
variable is used as a proxy for macroeconomic (in)stability.  
The coefficient estimates for this variable are statistically significant the 10% level in 
4 out of the 6 regressions. In all 6 regressions, the ALSI volatility variable is negative, 
as expected a priori. A higher volatility variable would indicate greater 
macroeconomic instability which one would expect to deter potential investors.  
In the VAR model the coefficient estimates of ALSI volatility are negative and all are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, therefore supporting the result above. 
The ECM coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
the effect of macroeconomic volatility on FDI inflows is significantly larger in the long 
term than in the short term. 
 




The number of mobile and fixed line telephone subscribers per 100 people acts as a 
proxy for infrastructure. The coefficient estimates for the infrastructure variable are 
statistically significant at the 10% level in 4 out of the 5 regressions in which it is 
included. In all regressions the coefficient estimate is positive, indicating that as 
infrastructure improves, FDI inflows will increase.  
The VAR model provides similar results. The coefficient estimates of Infrastructure in 
the VAR model are all positive and two out of three of the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
The ECM indicates that there is a divergence in the short and long-term effects of 
infrastructure development on FDI inflows. This too is unsurprising, both 
infrastructure development and FDI are long-term decisions and therefore the 
relationship between them is largely a long-tem rather than short-term one. 
 
4.1.12 Trend 
The Trend variable is included in two of the regressions and is statistically significant 
at the 5% level and positive in both cases. This shows that FDI inflows to South 
Africa have been increasing over time, independent of the other variables in the 
model. As time has gone by, the openness of many economies around the world to 
investment flows in and out has increased and MNCs have increasingly been looking 
for investment opportunities around the world. This effect is captured by the trend 
variable. The Trend variable will also capture some technology improvements. As 
global technology improves, it becomes easier and more profitable for MNCs to 
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4.2 Panel Data Model 
The dependent variable in the panel data model is the natural log of FDI inflows to 
each specific sector for a given year. The period studied in this model is 1995-2009. 
 
4.2.1 Multicollinearity 
Within the panel data model, the R2 value is also very high – over 0.96 in all four 
regressions. The majority of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant, 
though there are a reasonably large minority of coefficient estimates that are not 
statistically significant. Hence, these results do not conclusively confirm whether or 
not multicollinearity is present within this model. 
The VIF stats for the panel data model tend to be somewhat higher than in the time 
series model for the first three regressions, with LaglnGSP and a number of the 
sector dummies’ VIF values exceeding 10. This indicates that there may be high 
multicollinearity, unsurprisingly, between LaglnGSP and specific sector dummy 
variables. This is confirmed by the high pairwise correlations between these 
variables. Therefore, in the fourth regression, LaglnGSP is dropped from the model. 
In none of the first three models was this variable statistically significant, whilst there 
is also a relatively strong theoretical argument to suggest that this variable does not 
have a strong influence on describing sector specific FDI inflows. 
The number of insignificant t-stats within the fourth regression is reduced to just 
three; whilst the average VIF for the model falls to 4.57, well below the critical value 







Table 2 . Panel Data Model Regression Results
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Name Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat) Estimates (t-stat)
Ln GSP Lagged -0.4830168 (-0.84 ) -0.5700153 (-1.01)  -0.5771506 (-1.02)
Openness lagged 0.0471947 (1.21) 0.000429 (0.01)  0.0031884 (0.07)  0.0004911 (0.01)
GVT Expenditure -0.128542*** (-2.65) -0.058554 (-1.08) -0.0653144 (-1.16) -0.064436 (-1.21)
Exchange Rate  0.1674646*** (3.22) 0.0311288 (0.44) 0.0332722 (0.47)  0.0308059 (0.44)
Exchange Rate Volatility -0.0387555 (1.23) -0.0840328** (2.14) -0.0812572** (2.01)  -0.085834** (2.41)
ALSI Volatility -0.00033*** (-2.60)  -0.0003221*** (-2.54)  -0.0003209** (-2.55)  -0.0003314*** (-2.69)
Infrastructure  0.0060927 (1.16)  0.0158824* ( 1.86)  0.0150569* (1.68)  0.1306198*** (2.77)
Education  0.1128695** (2.36) 0.1252733** (2.14) 0.1162901* (1.72)  0.0155093** (2.47)
Labour Productivity  0.0379653** (2.10)  0.0336992 (1.43) 0.0401388*** (2.67)
Labour Costs (General) -0.0180246 (0.40)
Labour Costs (Private) -0.0085808 (0.29)
Sector 2 Dum  5.108267*** (7.64) 5.203052*** (7.94) 5.210826*** (7.95) 4.582017*** (20.47)
Sector 3 Dum  5.731765*** (5.12) 5.897252*** (5.37) 5.910824*** (5.38)  4.81298*** (21.5)
Sector 4 Dum -4.004766*** (-16.35) -4.017509*** (-16.77) -4.018554*** (-16.78) -3.934015*** (-17.57)
Sector 5 Dum  0.3536837 (1.50)  0.3458481 (1.50)  0.3452054 (1.50) 0.397187* (1.77)
Sector 6 Dum 3.931886*** (4.22)  4.068122*** (4.46) 4.079295*** (4.47) 3.175503*** (14.18)
Sector 7 Dum 3.174404*** (4.52)  3.274517*** (4.76) 3.282727*** (4.77) 2.618578*** (11.70)
Sector 8 Dum  5.792959*** (5.06) 5.96234*** (5.31) 5.976232*** (5.32) 4.852551*** (21.68)
Sector 9 Dum  0.2124986 (0.17) 0.3945512 (0.33) 0.4094826 (0.34) -0.7982595*** (-3.57)
Constant 0.8051963 (0.13) -2.556631 (-0.39) -2.182387 (-0.33) -8.13112** (-2.20)
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
Sector 1 Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing
Sector 2 Mining and Quarrying
Sector 3 Manufacturing
Sector 4 Electricity, Gas and Water
Sector 5 Construction
Sector 6 Wholesale and retail trade, catering and accomodation
Sector 7 Transport, Storage and Communication
Sector 8 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services
Sector 9 Community, Social and Personal Services
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4.2.2 Heteroskedasticity 
The calculated test statistics of White’s test from the panel data model are 
significantly higher than in the time series model, ranging from 61.329 to 64.621. 
However due to the much higher degrees of freedom within the panel data model, all 
of these calculated test statistics are below the critical chi-squared value at the 1% 
level. Therefore we can conclude that heteroskedasticity is not a major problem 
within the panel data model. 
 
4.2.3 Real GSP 
The variable GSP (Gross Sector Product) measures the gross output for specific 
sectors in specific years. This variable is therefore a proxy for the size of the sector 
and therefore how this affects the inflows of FDI to that sector. The variable is lagged 
one period and natural logged.  
In all three regressions, the coefficient estimates are negative but are not statistically 
significant in any. The lack of statistical significance indicates that the size of the 
specific sector under consideration has little impact on FDI flows, suggesting that 
other factors, such as the nature of the sector and government regulation 
surrounding specific sectors are more important in determining FDI inflows. 
The negative sign, though not statistically significant, suggests that the larger the 
sector, the smaller the FDI inflows into that sector. Initially this result appears 
counter-intuitive as MNCs should be attracted to a larger market size as shown in 
the time series regression. However as GSP measures only the size of specific 
sector under consideration, it is not really a very good measure of overall market 
size. It also indicates that the smaller sectors may be small due to underinvestment 
in those economic activities and foreign investment may see this as a profit 
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4.2.4 Openness 
The coefficient estimates for the variable openness are not statistically significant in 
any of the regressions and is positive in all of them. The positive sign concurs with 
our a priori expectations in that a more open economy will attract greater levels of 
FDI. However, as in the time series model, the variable is not statistically significant. 
This may be due to potential multicollinearity. An alternative explanation could be 
that the variable is included primarily as a proxy for openness of the economy in 
general (not just imports and exports) and hence openness to FDI. In practice this 
may not be such a clear relationship. Also, most FDI into South Africa is market-
seeking, as opposed to efficiency-seeking, and hence investors may not be 
particularly concerned by the openness of the economy to trade. 
 
4.2.5 Government Expenditure 
The Government Expenditure coefficient estimates are all negative, with one 
estimate being statistically significant at the 1% level. This result concurs with my 
results from the previous model, indicating that South Africa’s government 
expenditure is higher than is optimal for attracting FDI. 
 
4.2.6 Exchange Rate   
The coefficient estimates for both exchange rate variables concur with the results 
from the previous results. The estimates for the exchange rate variable are all 
positive, with one statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that FDI inflows 
increase when the exchange rate depreciates. 
All three coefficient estimates for exchange rate volatility are negative, with three out 
of four statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that higher exchange rate 
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4.2.7 ALSI Volatility 
The coefficient estimates for ALSI volatility are also consistent with those in the time 
series model, with all estimates negative. However the coefficient estimates for this 
variable are much more statistically significant in the panel data model, with all four 
estimates statistically significant at the 5% level. The shorter and more recent time 
period of the panel data model, as compared to the time series model may account 
for this difference. The size and therefore liquidity of the JSE has grown 
exponentially over the past two decades, therefore providing a much more fluid 
market and hence a much better and comprehensive measure of macroeconomic 
(in)stability. Furthermore the Stock exchange’s ‘public image’ has grown just as 
swiftly, with its performance now freely and easily available almost constantly to a 
large proportion of the population. This would therefore also suggest that potential 
foreign investors have also started taking greater cognisance of the exchange as a 
measure of macroeconomic performance and stability.  
 
4.2.8 Infrastructure 
The coefficient estimates for the infrastructure proxy variable are all positive, with 
three out of four significant at the 10% level. These results are congruent with those 
from the time series model and unsurprisingly indicate that greater FDI inflows are 
correlated with greater infrastructure capabilities. 
 
4.2.9 Education 
Secondary school enrolment acts as a rough proxy for level of education or human 
capital in the economy as a whole. The variable was not included in the time series 
model as there were too many missing data points. Within the panel data model, the 
coefficient estimates for education are all significant at the 10% level and are all 
positive. This result concurs with a priori expectations as the level of education in the 
economy is expected to significantly raise FDI inflows, as indicated by this result. 
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4.2.10 Labour Productivity 
Labour Productivity is measured each year by the Reserve Bank. In this data, 2000 
is equal to 100 and all other years are calculated relative to this. Two of the 
coefficient estimates is significant at the 5% level and both are positive. As would be 
expected, a higher labour productivity is likely to lead to decreasing FDI inflows as 
MNCs would like to be as productive as possible so as to maximise potential profits. 
What is interesting about this result is that in recent years, the trend for labour 
productivity in South Africa has been downward – from a high of 104.7 in 2001, 
labour productivity in 2009 was calculated to be as low as 79.7. 
 
4.2.11 Labour Costs 
The cost of labour is very important to firms and is closely linked to labour 
productivity. Any firm would like to maximise their marginal productivity of labour, so 
higher labour productivity and lower labour costs should attract more foreign 
investment. In this model two measures for labour costs are included, in different 
regressions. The first is private labour costs, which are the costs of labour to the 
private sector only, which is where most FDI is concentrated. The second measure is 
general labour costs which is the costs of labour to the entire economy – both private 
and public sector. Annual labour Costs, similarly to labour productivity, is calculated 
in relation to one another. With 2000 being the base year, where labour costs equal 
100. 
Neither of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant, though both are 
negative. This result suggests that rising labour costs do lead to falling FDI inflows, 
but the result may not be particularly significant and so this effect may be small or 
negligible. 
 
4.2.12 Sector Dummies 
The Sector Dummies show which sectors FDI is attracted to relatively more, ceteris 
paribus. The base dummy is sector 1 which is agriculture, forestry and fishing. All 
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coefficient estimates for the other dummies indicate how much FDI inflows those 
sectors attract relative to sector 1. 
Six out of the eight sector dummy coefficient estimates are highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the amount of FDI inflows to different sectors, based on the intrinsic 
factors of those sectors. 
Sectors 2 (Mining and Quarrying), 3 (Manufacturing), and 8 (Finance, Insurance, real 
Estate and Business Services) have the highest coefficient estimates, indicating that 
these three sectors attract the most FDI. Sector 2 would attract natural resource 
based FDI, and due to South Africa’s large mineral deposits, it is unsurprising that 
this is one of the main attractors of FDI. Sector 3 is Manufacturing which is a sector 
that traditionally attracts large amounts of FDI as foreign investors, with newer 
technology than the host country, are able to produce manufactured goods more 
efficiently and therefore more cheaply than local industries. Lastly, sector 8 is 
Finance and business services. The service sector is the largest in South Africa, as 
well as the fastest growing hence it is not surprising that it is also a major attractor of 
FDI. A few large foreign investments in this sector in recent years have also boosted 
this sector e.g. Barclays purchased a majority share of ABSA bank in 2005 for 
approximately R30 billion. 
Sector 4 (Electricity, Gas and Water) attracted the lowest amount of FDI, ceteris 
paribus. This is unsurprising as this sector is mainly utilities which are all parastatals 
and so are owned by government. There is, therefore, little scope for foreign 
investors to invest in these enterprises unless there is privatisation, which has not 
occurred to this point. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The models find a number of variables which have consistently statistically 
significant coefficient estimates through different model specifications. The estimates 
for real GDP are consistently highly significant and positive, thus indicating that a 
larger market size results in higher levels of FDI inflows. The coefficient estimates for 
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the Apartheid and Sanctions dummies are also generally statistically significant and 
indicate that the Apartheid regime and the introduction of Sanctions on the country 
both had a negative effect on FDI inflows to the country, ceteris paribus. 
The estimates for Openness are all positive, suggesting greater openness may lead 
to higher FDI, but only one estimate is statistically significant, though this may be 
partly due to multicollinearity. The estimates for government expenditure are all 
negative with about half statistically significant indicating that government 
expenditure in South Africa is too high to maximise FDI inflows. 
The exchange rate estimates indicate that the weaker the Rand is relative to the 
dollar, the more FDI will flow into the country. The estimates for both exchange rate 
volatility and ALSI volatility are all negative and are mostly significant. This shows 
that potential investors dislike instability and uncertainty and will invest more readily 
in a less volatile economic environment.   
The estimates for both infrastructure and education are positive and statistically 
significant and show that skill levels within society as well as the overall availability 
and prevalence of infrastructure are both very important to potential investors. 
Labour productivity and costs are also important to foreign investors. MNCs require 
high productivity from its labour and relatively low costs for that labour. 
Lastly, the panel data model shows that Sectors 2 (Mining and Quarrying), 3 
(Manufacturing), and 8 (Finance, Insurance, real Estate and Business Services) are 
the three sectors that are intrinsically most attractive to FDI, whilst Sector 4 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This study used a two model approach to find the determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) into South Africa since 1961. Numerous studies have discussed 
and shown the potential benefits of FDI inflows to the host country. Thus FDI can act 
as an important driver of economic growth, particularly in developing countries such 
as South Africa. This foreign investment encourages greater efficiency through 
foreign technology transfer and increased competition. It is therefore important for 
countries to determine what the major determinants of FDI inflows are, in order to 
adjust policies and practices so as to become more attractive to potential FDI flows. 
Studies from around the world have indicated that the major determinants of FDI 
include market size, education levels, infrastructure, openness, exchange rates, 
political and macroeconomic stability, and wage rates. All of these factors improve a 
country’s investment climate as they increase potential benefits for foreign investors 
whilst reducing the costs of business as well as the risk. Such investment-friendly 
measures will not only benefit foreign investment, but also domestic investment. De 
Soysa and Oneal (1999) found that both forms of investment have a positive effect 
on economic growth and are complementary. 
Although many determinants of FDI are relatively universal, it is important to 
establish country-specific determinants as each different country faces different 
challenges and may excel in certain areas but struggle in others. Every different 
country faces slightly different constraints and hence determinants of investment will 
vary as will the relative importance of these determinants. For example, South 
Africa’s historical context, which included the Apartheid regime from 1948-1994, 
means that the country faces certain unique constraints and therefore it is important 
to establish South Africa-specific determinants and their relative importance in 
attracting FDI. 
Fedderke and Romm (2004) and Moolman et al. (2006) have conducted previous 
studies on the determinants of FDI inflows to South Africa. Both used time series 
models and found average wage, corporate tax rate, a self-constructed property 
rights index, openness to trade, infrastructure, exchange rate, and market size to all 
be statistically significant variables in explaining South African FDI inflows. 
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This paper tests a relatively similar time series model to those presented above, for 
the period 1961-2009. The main statistically significant variable estimates included 
real GDP, as a proxy for market size, an Apartheid dummy, government expenditure, 
exchange rate, and infrastructure. These results concur with similar studies from 
around the world as well as with previous South Africa-specific studies. However, 
interestingly, coefficient estimates for Openness were only statistically significant in 
one regression model, although this may be due to problems associated with 
multicollinearity within the model. 
This paper then goes further to conduct a panel data analysis of FDI inflows between 
1995 and 2009. This analysis has a number of important advantages to the time 
series model. Firstly, in the South African context, due to the influence of the 
Apartheid regime, economic indicators and determinants of investment may have 
changed fundamentally since 1994 as the political (and economic) landscape 
changed fundamentally. As the aim of this study is to provide a potential policy guide 
for attracting future FDI inflows, this period may provide a better guide for future 
determinants as opposed to the rarefied nature of the Apartheid period.  
A second advantage of the panel data model is the relative availability of data in 
recent years. Much of the data prior to 1990 for South Africa is incomplete and/or 
unreliable and hence a study including only recent years, allows the inclusion of a 
number of new but potentially very important variables. These include labour 
productivity, labour costs and most importantly a proxy for education levels within the 
economy. The panel data model also allows the specific investigation which sectors 
attract more FDI, ceteris paribus and to analyse the effects of sector size on the FDI 
inflows to each specific sector.  
The results indicate that ALSI volatility (acting as a proxy for macroeconomic 
(in)stability) and exchange rate volatility are both negative and highly statistically 
significant. This indicates, unsurprisingly, that investors are averse to instability as it 
increases uncertainty and therefore risk. However what is interesting about this 
result is that the estimates are much more significant in the panel data model than in 
the time series model, suggesting that these variables have increased in importance 
over recent decades. 
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Other variables which show statistically significant coefficient estimates include 
education, infrastructure, and labour productivity indicating the importance of these 
variables. Lastly the model shows that the mining and quarrying; manufacturing; and 
finance, insurance, real estate, and business services sectors attract the most FDI 
based purely on the nature of these sectors. 
 
5.1 Policy Implications 
 The results of this analysis give an idea of the major determinants of FDI inflows into 
South Africa. Policy makers can therefore potentially increase FDI inflows by 
improving or changing policies to affect the determinants highlighted by the analysis. 
GDP or market size is a major determinant of FDI, however it is not really possible 
for policy makers to increase GDP easily. Increasing GDP or economic growth is a 
major aim of policy makers already and there is no quick or easy way to increase it. 
Furthermore there is two-way relationship between GDP and FDI. 
Freeing up trade and increasing the openness of the economy may have a positive 
effect of FDI inflows; however, this analysis indicates that this effect may be fairly 
limited. There have been a number of significant tariff reductions over the past ten to 
fifteen years, suggesting that the focus of policymakers should now; perhaps shift 
towards other areas – at least with regards to maximising FDI inflows. 
An interesting and illuminating result of this analysis is the effect of the exchange 
rate on FDI versus inflation. This study shows that a stable and weaker Rand relative 
to the dollar (and other currencies) will increase FDI inflows. Whilst it may be going 
too far to conclude that a fixed exchange rate at a depreciated level is the answer, it 
does suggest that some greater level of exchange rate management may benefit the 
country’s attractiveness to Foreign investors, whilst recent calls for a depreciation in 
the exchange rate appear to hold some weight. 
The ALSI variable acts as a proxy for macroeconomic (in)stability. The significance 
and negative value of its coefficient estimates show the importance of a stable 
macroeconomic (and political) environment. Hence policymakers should ensure 
long-term policies are instituted, with change kept to a minimum. Since 2001/2, it 
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would appear that the government has been reasonably successful in maintaining a 
level of macroeconomic stability – growth rates (until 2007/08) were quite predictable 
and constant from year to year; inflation-targeting by the Reserve Bank maintained 
inflation between a prescribed band, whilst the interest rate changes were well 
advertised and did not provide shocks to the environment. Unfortunately, through 
trade and investment ties to the rest of the world, South Africa is not immune to 
global economic crises resulting in the recent economic depression. However, even 
this setback was not as severe as it may have been (and was in other countries) due 
to the governments previous prudence with spending as well as the introduction of 
the Credit Act which was also aimed at ensuring a fairly stable economy (amongst 
other aims). Hence it would appear that policymakers have been fairly successful in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability within South Africa in recent years.  
However due to the growing size and greater monetary in- and out-flows, the ALSI 
variable has become more significant in recent years. Policymakers need to also 
realise the importance of sentiment and investor beliefs. Whilst macroeconomic 
fundamentals may be sound, sentiment is often an important driver of foreign 
investment and therefore macroeconomic stability as well, albeit far less so with FDI. 
Hence political announcements, infighting and any generally unstable portrayal of 
the country may have negative impacts for investors perception of the stability of the 
country and hence for FDI inflows. 
The statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for the Infrastructure and 
Education variables illustrates the importance of an effective infrastructure and the 
development of skills. Therefore the South African government should promote 
infrastructure investment and skills development. However the effect of increasing 
government expenditure is negative, although this result is not statistically significant. 
Therefore the importance of improving the local infrastructure and skills outweighs 
the importance of decreasing government expenditure but the government should 
still aim to spend less, and so should aim to decrease spending in other areas and 
focus on improving infrastructure and skills. The government also needs to focus on 
how that money is spent rather than simply increasing expenditure. At the moment 
education receives more expenditure than any other department, yet the matric pass 
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rates continue to fall indicating that more effective institutions and processes need to 
be put in place rather than simply increasing expenditure. 
Lastly, the regressions show that labour productivity is an important determinant of 
FDI inflows; however, the data also indicates that labour productivity is worsening. It 
is absolutely imperative that this trend is reversed. Improved skills and education is 
one avenue through which this can be improved, but fails to explain the current 
downward trend. The strict labour laws of South Africa ensure that it is very difficult 
to fire an employee, even if they are failing to work productively. This creates the 
wrong incentives for employees and may be part of the reason for the low and falling 
labour productivity within the country. 
This paper has discussed the potential benefits from FDI to the host country, arguing 
that these benefits outweigh potential costs and that developing countries such as 
South Africa should pursue FDI, though not through distorting policies such as fiscal 
or tax incentives. The findings of this study broadly concur with the findings of most 
of the global literature as well as, more pertinently, with previous South Africa-
specific studies with regards to the major determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
inflows. This study also goes further than a simple time series regression analysis 
with the inclusion of the panel data analysis which tests for determinants of FDI since 
apartheid, shows which sectors are intrinsically most attractive to FDI and lastly 
allows for the inclusion of a number of additional explanatory variables for which 
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Table 1 . Table of Stationarity
Random Walk without drift Random Walk with drift Random Walk with drift and trend Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationary/Non-Stationary
1% critical value -2.62 -3.58 -4.15 -3.48 -
5% critical value -1.95 -2.93 -3.5 -2.88 -
Variable Name Calculated Tau Values Calculated Tau Values Calculated Tau Values Calculated Tau Values
FDI 1.871 1.169 0.886 2.073 Non-stationary
GDP 7.76 1.676 2.726 1.439 Non-stationary
Openness 0.566 -0.176 -0.242 -1.091 Non-stationary
GVT expenditure 1.167 -1.6 -2.123 -2.405 Non-stationary
Exchange Rate 1.335 0.186 5.301 0.191 Non-stationary
Exchange Rate Volatility -2.018 -2.314 -3.058 -2.314 Non-stationary
ALSI Volatility 1.165 0.527 -1.136 -1.334 Non-stationary
Infrastructure 1.198 1.206 0.557 1.206 Non-stationary
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Table 2 . Vector Autoregressive Model Results
Regression (1) (2) (3)
Variable Name Estimates Estimates Estimates
Ln GDP Lagged 0.8987669** 1.097301** 1.050028*
Apartheid Dummy 0.2819759*
Sanctions Dummy 0.0240019
Openness lagged 0.0090918 0.0205695*** 0.0222371**
GVT Expenditure -0.0097199 -0.0235317 -0.0222943
Exchange Rate 0.0146323 0.0696085  0.0657966
Exchange Rate Volatility -0.0263934 -0.0833574** -0.0831566**
ALSI Volatility -0.0001779** -0.0001784** -0.000181**
Infrastructure  0.0000453 0.0059015** 0.0060859**
Constant  -10.33819** -13.76854** -13.3323**
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 3 . Error Correction Model Regression Results
Variable Name Estimated Coefficient










*,**,*** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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